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SEPARATION ANXIETY: REDEFINING THE CONTOURS OF
THE “NEXUS” APPROACH UNDER TITLE III OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT FOR HEAVILY
INTEGRATED BUT SEPARATELY OWNED WEBSITES AND
“PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION”
*

Mark Keddis
I. INTRODUCTION

In 2012, Hurricane Sandy left millions of households and
commercial entities disconnected from the Internet in the midst of
1
overwhelming power outages. Loss of access to the World Wide Web
is a significant hindrance today given society’s increased reliance on
2
technology. But each and every day, countless individuals like Karen
Beth Young constantly face their own version of inaccessibility for
another reason—the Internet is an imperfect technology that is often
3
at odds with their particular disabilities. While the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) is a vital tool for combating disability
4
discrimination, “Title III has been less successful than was originally
*
J.D. cum laude, 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Rutgers
University, New Brunswick, NJ. Special thanks to Professor John Jacobi for his
valuable guidance and to my wife, family, and friends for their overwhelming support
over the last several years.
1
Joe Van Brussel, Hurricane Sandy Power Outages Send New Yorkers Streaming North
in Search of Current, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 30, 2012, 7:04 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/30/hurricane-sandy-power-outages-new
-yorkers_n_2046187.html.
2
Stephanie Khouri, Welcome to the New Town Square of Today’s Global Village:
Website Accessibility for Individuals with Disabilities after Target and the 2008 Amendments
to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 331, 342 (2010)
(“In today’s society, it is hard to imagine a world without the Internet.”); Rick
Newman, 10 Things We Can’t Live Without, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 18, 2010,
5:35 PM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/flowchart/2010/05/18/10
-things-we-cant-live-without (“In a Pew Research Center survey from last year, highspeed Internet was one of only three things people said was more of a necessity in
2009 than in 2006.”).
3
See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
4
LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING
DISABILITY RIGHTS 299 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2003) (“The ADA creates an expansive
antidiscrimination mandate.”).
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5

hoped.” Congress and the courts have been unable to agree on a
standard for determining Title III’s applicability to the Internet at a
time where litigation involving web-based businesses is on the rise,
6
demonstrating Title III’s fragility.
Differing interpretations of the statutory language itself fuel the
7
uncertainty surrounding Title III’s applicability to the Internet. Title
III aims to prevent discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
8
operates a place of public accommodation.” Courts specifically
disagree as to whether the term “place of public accommodation”
9
includes virtual spaces that affect commerce and at what point, if at
10
all, a website becomes a service of a place of public accommodation.
Courts must resolve such questions in order to implement Title
III’s purpose—to ensure access to places of public accommodation—
because, for some disabled persons, closing a virtual door may have
11
the effect of completely denying access to the accommodation. The
5

Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
377, 379 (2000).
6
WILLIAM D. GOREN, UNDERSTANDING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 131
(Am. Bar Ass’n, 3d Ed. 2010) (“The question of how Title III of the ADA applies to
the Internet is not going to go away, especially as e-commerce takes over all of our
lives.” ); see also infra note 95 and accompanying text. Compare Nat’l Fed’n of the
Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding Title III
applicable to inaccessible website as a service of a place of public accommodation),
with Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla.
2002) (finding Title III not applicable to inaccessible website as a place of public
accommodation itself due to its virtual, as opposed to physical, nature).
7
See generally Jonathan R. Mook, Mook on the ADAs Application to the Internet, 2008
EMERGING ISSUES 1780 (2008) (discussing the development of case law regarding
Title III’s applicability to the Internet and comparing various court interpretations of
Title III’s statutory language from such cases).
8
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006).
9
Under Title III, a public accommodation is a private entity whose operations
affect commerce. Id. § 12181(7).
10
E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946.
11
MARGARET C. JASPER, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 25 (Oceana Publ’ns
1998) (“Businesses which have more than one public entrance must provide at least
one accessible entrance during business hours.”); Colker, supra note 5, at 402
(emphasis added) (“The purpose of ADA Title III, however, was to remedy the lack of
access to places of public accommodation by individuals with disabilities.”); Ryan
Campbell Richards, Current Issues in Public Policy: Reconciling the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Commercial Websites: A Feasible Solution?, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
520, 522 (2010) (“The Americans with Disabilities Act requires universal access to
places of public accommodation and their respective services.”). A retailer with an
inaccessible website may indeed close all doors to a disabled consumer who is
attempting to make purchases when the physical entrance to a brick-and-mortar
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ADA strives to address day-to-day discrimination and integrate the
12
disabled into the “economic and social mainstream.” Commerce,
however, has evolved concurrently with technology, such that the
Internet is now the most pervasive method of communication for
13
both social networking and business. Therefore, courts must settle
the issue of Title III’s applicability to the Internet in order to ensure
that the way in which an entity engages in commerce does not
determine whether a disabled customer can access its goods and
14
services.
Over the years, courts have developed a plethora of case law
store is closed. Khouri, supra note 2 (“It is clear the retail industry relies a great deal
on its websites.”). There is a question as to what may constitute business hours when
a retailer has a website because consumers can make purchases on a retailer’s website
at all hours of the day. Id. Courts must resolve the questions surrounding Title III’s
applicability to the Internet because the ADA is an important—and often the only—
avenue of relief for disabled individuals. Colker, supra note 5, at 380 (“Although
state law can sometimes serve as a remedial gap filler . . . that result has not occurred
under ADA Title III.”).
12
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
381; 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006) (“It is the purpose of this Act to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.”); Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc., 578 F.3d
787, 792–93 (8th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (“[The ADA] is to be accorded a liberal construction in
order to carry out the purposes of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience,
unfairness and humiliation of . . . discrimination.”). There is also a significant public
policy consideration that exemplifies the ADA’s mandate for adequate
communication capacity. Martin v. Metro Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 225 F. Supp.
2d 1362, 1383 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (emphasis added) (“The ADA embodies a national
policy that encourages self-reliance and self-sufficiency.”). While Martin is a Title II case,
the court clearly saw a need to require better accommodations to the public. See id.
13
See supra note 2. Facebook is a prime example of a dominant method of
communication today for social networking and also for commerce—now with its
own “virtual currency.” See infra notes 29, 102. While Facebook’s social networking
platform is the primary driving force behind its stellar reputation, the company now
profits from advertising and from selling its “Facebook Credits.” See discussion infra
Part II.D.2. There is a question as to whether, for Title III purposes, a website with
social influence carries the same weight as one with commercial influence; the
answer is that Facebook penetrates both virtual and physical walls and therefore at
least warrants the consideration that it is significant enough to come under Title III’s
reach. See Facebook Info. Mission Statement, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com
/facebook?sk=info (last visited Jan. 27, 2012) (“Facebook’s mission is to give people
the power to share and make the world more open and connected.”).
14
The term “commerce” includes “communications.” § 12181(1). Title III
prevents the escape of liability “through contractual, licensing, or other
arrangements,” and “prohibit[s] a public accommodation [from] doing indirectly
through a contractual relationship what it may not do directly.”
Id. §
12182(b)(1)(A)(i) (alteration in original). Facebook could be an example of a
virtual entity that attempts to escape liability because it authorizes retail stores to sell
gift cards that purchasers can only use on its website. See discussion infra Part II.D.
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regarding Title III’s applicability to the Internet with two prominent
15
The first—and more hotly
arguments ultimately emerging.
contested—argument is that the Internet is a place of public
accommodation irrespective of its virtual nature because its
16
operations often affect commerce. Courts, however, disagree as to
whether Title III’s public-accommodation provision is limited in its
17
coverage to only physical places; this debate is currently unresolved.
This Comment will not address that issue, and will therefore define a
18
place of public accommodation as a “place” in the physical sense.
The second argument—this Comment’s focal point—is an
alternative to the first that involves the application of the “nexus”
19
approach to websites.
Under this argument, a plaintiff can
15

E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (considering whether a website
can be a service of a place of public accommodation); Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest
Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (considering whether a website
can itself be a place of public accommodation).
16
E.g., Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (plaintiff arguing southwest.com itself to
be a place of public accommodation because it is a virtual space whose operations
affect commerce); see also Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1999);
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999); Ford v. ScheringPlough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121
F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997); Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n,
37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
17
§ 12181(7). Compare Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19 (placing weight on the fact that
Title III’s drafters included “travel services” among the enumerated list of public
accommodations along with “service establishments,” demonstrating the inclusion of
service providers that do not require the physical presence of a consumer), and Nat’l
Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., No. 11-CV-30168, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84518, at
*9–11 (D. Mass. June 19, 2012) (relying on Carparts and finding a “Watch Instantly”
video–streaming website to be a Title III place of public accommodation as either a
service establishment, place of entertainment, or a rental establishment that provides
services in the home), with Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318 (finding congressional
intent to be clear that Title III governs only physical places of public accommodation
given the comprehensive definition of a public accommodation). This Comment
may utilize certain aspects of this argument, when appropriate, to further the
question presented. For an overview of the debate between physical and virtual
places under Title III, see generally Jeffrey Bashaw, Applying the Americans with
Disabilities Act to Private Websites after National Federation of the Blind v. Target, 4
SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH 3 (2008); Isabel Arana DuPree, Websites as “Places of Public
Accommodation”: Amending the Americans with Disabilities Act in the Wake of National
Federation of the Blind v. Target Corporation, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 273 (2007).
18
Both the Northern District of California and the Southern District of Florida
have declared that a place of public accommodation must be a physical structure.
Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Earll v. eBay, Inc.,
No. 5:11-cv-00262-JF, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100360 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2011); Nat’l
Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946; Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312.
19
Plaintiffs can use the “nexus” argument as an alternative route because it does
not ask whether the Internet itself is a public accommodation. E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the
Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946. While some legal scholars advocate for different
approaches to determine Title III’s applicability to the Internet, this Comment will
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demonstrate a violation of the ADA on the basis of unequal access to
services by establishing a “nexus” between the challenged service and
20
a place of public accommodation. National Federation of the Blind v.
Target Corp. is the seminal case that extends this approach to
21
websites. Target represents the scenario of a single entity that owns
two spaces—one virtual and one physical—where the former is
noncompliant with ADA standards while the later is compliant with
22
such standards.
The Target court’s ruling establishes that an
inaccessible website can be a service of a place of public
accommodation if it is “heavily integrated” with, or acts as a gateway
23
to, the place. The term “integration” is a source of lucidity because
not address such arguments. For an analysis of the efficiency of such proposals,
compare Nikki D. Kessling, Why the Target “Nexus Test” Leaves Disabled Americans
Disconnected: A Better Approach to Determine Whether Private Commercial Websites are “Places
of Public Accommodation,” 45 HOUS L. REV. 991 (2008), with Richard E. Moberly, The
Americans with Disabilities Act in Cyberspace: Applying the “Nexus” Approach to Private
Internet Websites, 55 MERCER L. REV. 963 (2004).
20
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 952. The “nexus” approach applies
Title III to intangible barriers pursuant to the language “services of,” as opposed to
“services in,” a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006). A
plaintiff seeking to establish a Title III claim must also generally establish three
elements. Id.; Camarillo v. Carrols Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2008). The first
is the demonstration of a disability within the meaning of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A) (2006) (“The term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an individual, a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual.”). The second, and most relevant for this Comment’s
purpose, is that the defendant owns, leases, or operates a place of public
accommodation. § 12182(a). The third is that the defendant created discriminatory
conditions through the denial of the full and equal opportunity to enjoy or
participate in the services it provides. Id.; Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294
F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949.
21
452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006); 4 IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE &
INTERNET LAW: TREATISE WITH FORMS § 48.06[4] (2d ed. Supp. 2011), available at
Westlaw ECOMMINTLAW (“Although Target Corp. was merely a district court
decision . . . the case nonetheless has sparked similar suits in the Northern District of
California and been influential in encouraging companies to make their sites
accessible to disabled users.”); see also discussion infra Part II.B. While Access Now
came before Target, it did not extend application of the “nexus” approach to
websites; rather, Access Now is a critical decision for determining whether the Internet
itself can be a place of public accommodation. See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest
Airlines, Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2004) (plaintiffs raising “nexus”
argument for the first time on appeal, and, thus, preventing the court from
considering the argument due to its limited scope of review); see also discussion infra
Part II.A.3.
22
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949–950. Before cases like Target,
Title III litigation typically involved only one space—a noncompliant physical place
of public accommodation. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
23
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 954–55. Websites create a form of
intangible discrimination, meaning that the website either creates a separate benefit
for those able to access it, or prevents enjoyment or usage, of the goods or services of
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it allows Title III liability to reach noncompliant virtual spaces that act
24
as a doorway to a physical space. But, at the same time, the term is
also a source of confusion because the court did not provide concrete
instructions for applying the “nexus” approach to future Internet
25
cases.
While Target allowed Title III to reach a noncompliant virtual
space that the retailer owned and operated, the court did not
anticipate that a noncompliant virtual space may well be integrated
26
27
with a separately owned compliant physical space —until recently. In
2011, Karen Beth Young presented the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California, the same jurisdiction that
decided Target, with an opportunity to revisit the “nexus” approach in
28
such a situation. Young, a disabled individual, brought a Title III
claim against Facebook, Inc. alleging that the company unlawfully
deactivated her account and prevented her from interacting with
society using the most pervasive method of communication today—
29
facebook.com. She was so adamant to resolve her dilemma that she
drove from her home in Maryland to Facebook’s headquarters in

a place of public accommodation. § 12182(a), (b)(1)(A).
24
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 956; see discussion infra Part II.B.
25
DuPree, supra note 17, at 290–91; see also discussion infra Part II.C.
26
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949. The Target court came close to
recognizing such a scenario when it allowed Title III to reach a noncompliant virtual
space that acted as a “door” to a compliant physical place of public accommodation;
however, the critical difference is that Target Corp. had unitary ownership and
control of both spaces. Id. (“Target.com is a website owned and operated by
Target.”); see also infra Figure 1. This distinction is important because while the
“nexus” approach and the term “integration” are judicially created mechanisms, Title
III still statutorily requires a defendant to have some form of ownership, leasing, or
operation of a place of public accommodation. § 12182(a).
27
The Young court may have had this exact scenario before it; however, the
court dismissed the claim without assessing the merits of the “nexus” argument.
Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115–16 (N.D. Cal. 2011). This
scenario has continued to recur throughout the years 2011 and into 2012, resulting
in ongoing Title III litigation. See infra note 95 and accompanying text; discussion
infra Part II.E.
28
Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. The great majority—or possibly the totality—
of Title III cases implicating questions of ownership, leasing, or operation have not
involved the Internet and the application of the “nexus” approach. See infra note 36.
Prior to Young, Title III website cases did not implicate issues of ownership. E.g.,
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949 (“Target.com is a website owned and
operated by Target.”).
29
Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1114–16; see also Jessica Guynn, Facebook Hits 1 Billion
Users, Reaching Historic Milestone, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Oct. 4, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/04/business/la-fi-tn-facebook-hits-historic
-milestone-1-billion-users-20121004 (“Facebook has hit the biggest milestone in the
company’s eight-year history: 1 billion users.”).
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California, and then appeared pro se in her Title III suit against the
30
Young argued that a “nexus” existed
billion-dollar company.
between the noncompliant Facebook website and various compliant
brick-and-mortar stores because Facebook advertised and provided its
gift cards, which purchasers could only redeem online for the virtual
31
currency “Facebook Credits,” through such stores. Ultimately, the
court dismissed the claim without reaching the merits of this
‘integration’ argument because the plaintiff had not asserted
Facebook’s ownership, leasing, or operation of a place of public
32
accommodation.
Young, however, sets the stage for this Comment’s question
presented: can a “nexus” exist under Title III of the ADA between a
noncompliant website and a separately owned place of public
accommodation when the website and the physical space are heavily
integrated, and the website’s inaccessibility prevents full and equal
enjoyment of the goods its company provides through that physical
33
place? This question remains important because Title III litigation
30

Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1114. It is quite likely that Young’s pro se status
played a factor in the court’s dismissal of her Title III claim because she “failed to
assert” a particular argument. Id. at 1116. Studies have shown that plaintiffs are
bringing meritorious Title III claims, but pro se litigants appear to be disadvantaged
as they lack the required legal knowledge and resources to pursue such actions. E.g.,
Jaime A. Eagan, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Empirical Look at U.S. District
Court Litigation Involving Government Services and Public Accommodations Claims (June
23, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1870601 (2007 study of U.S. District
Court ADA litigation showing that while 11% of such suits are brought by pro se
litigants, over half of those were dismissed without meaningful adjudication because
pro se plaintiffs lacked the “legal knowledge and resources to assist them in properly
serving litigation forms”). The Target plaintiffs were more fortunate because
advocacy organizations and their counselors are generally much more successful in
such suits. See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 948. This disparity in Title III
litigation results demonstrates the need to protect pro se plaintiffs. See, e.g., Young,
790 F. Supp. 2d 1110.
31
Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1114; Am. Compl. for Injunctive Relief and Damages
for Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., Cal.
Disabled Person Act, Cal. Civ. Code 54 et seq., Breach of Contract, Breach of Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Negligence at 2, 5, Young v.
Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 5:10-cv-03579-JF/PVT),
2010 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 7820, at *2–3, 9 (Dec. 10, 2010) [hereinafter
Amended Complaint].
32
Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
33
Courts have traditionally applied the “nexus” approach to a retailer that owns
and operates a website as opposed to a web-based retailer. Michael P. Anderson,
Ensuring Equal Access to the Internet for the Elderly: The Need to Amend Title III of the ADA,
19 ELDER L.J. 159, 180 (2011) (alteration in original) (“[T]he ‘nexus’ test applies
Title III of the ADA only to a website insomuch as it denies one the full use and
enjoyment of a brick-and-mortar store, thereby leaving out large web-only retail
websites . . . .”). This Comment examines a scenario similar to Target whereby a
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continues to persist against major web-based companies like Netflix
34
35
in 2011 and Redbox in 2012. In some ways, this question is a
modern twist on an old problem because courts have previously
extended Title III liability for a noncompliant physical space to a
non-owning entity through “operation”—a required but undefined
36
term under the ADA. But web-based companies create a unique
form of discrimination where a virtual space’s noncompliance can
37
penetrate a store’s once insurmountable bricks and mortar —even if
38
separately owned. Like the term “discrimination,” the word “place”
is a term of art that should embrace distinctive theories, such as
defining a company’s “operation” of a place in such a way to reflect
the existence of web-based entities—many of which have a physical
physical space is compliant but a virtual space is noncompliant; however, this
Comment deviates from Target in that each space is separately owned but appears to
be heavily integrated.
34
See infra note 95.
35
Vic Lee, Redbox Sued Over Access for Visually Impaired, AMERICAN BROADCASTING
COMPANY (Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section
=news/business&id=8503401; see discussion infra Part II.E.
36
E.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 665 (2001) (finding Title III
applicable to four-day golf tours operated on golf courses that third parties own);
Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 874 (9th Cir.
2004) (finding private groups staging a rodeo in a publicly owned arena for a limited
time to be “operators” of the arena under Title III); see also infra Figure 1. Although
Title III requires “operation,” the ADA has not assigned an explicit meaning to the
term. Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1995); Dahlberg
v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1102 (D. Colo. 2000); see also
KRIEGER, supra note 4, at 299 (“Many key definitions in the act are left open-ended.”).
Lack of a definition has forced courts to scrutinize specific facts of each case to
determine whether the particular defendant is an operator. See, e.g., Pickern v. Pier 1
Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2006) (determining whether store
owner was “operator” of a grassy strip and sidewalk that the city owned); Disabled
Rights Action Comm., 375 F.3d at 878; Neff, 58 F.3d at 1066 (determining whether
franchisor retained sufficient control over franchisee ice cream stores to be an
“operator” under Title III); Dahlberg, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1102 (determining whether
car-rental company operated facility during the time of the alleged discriminatory
conduct); United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 612 (E.D. Ky. 1998)
(determining whether franchisor was an “operator” for failure to make necessary
hotel repairs); Reed v. YMCA USA, No. 3:07-0765, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119311
(M.D. Tenn. July 22, 2008) (deciding whether franchisor exercised enough control
over franchisees by examining organization documents and involvement in wrongful
conduct).
37
E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (finding retailer-companion website’s inaccessibility to affect blind customers’
ability to print out coupons for store usage, order photos for store pick-up, or access
information on different store locations).
38
E.g., Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (plaintiff
alleging that Facebook membership account deactivation affected her ability to
redeem the value of Facebook Credit gift cards that consumers can purchase in
brick-and-mortar retail stores).
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presence in a place of public accommodation. Indeed, several webbased companies like Redbox have developed a physical presence in
separately owned brick-and-mortar retail stores by offering their
products or services through a specific part of the stores—like a
40
kiosk.
These companies’ websites create a separate benefit, for
those able to access it, or prevent full enjoyment of the goods and
services that such companies offer through places of public
41
accommodation—even when separately owned. Therefore, courts
should construct a definition for the term “operates” to allow for the
extension of the “nexus” approach to web-based entities in order to
42
avoid new analytical difficulties under Title III.
To provide an answer to the question presented, this Comment
will discuss how courts should define the concepts of “integration”
and “operation,” and the weight that courts should place on them
when analyzing the sufficiency of a proposed “nexus” test in Title III
website litigation. This Comment proposes the “Backdoor Nexus”,
43
which is a two-fold approach. First, courts should utilize a totality of
the circumstances method, including the Target factors, to define the
minimum degree of “integration” that the “nexus” approach requires
44
between a website and a public accommodation. Second, courts
39

TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL ANROW-RICHMAN & CHARLES A. SULLIVAN,
EMPLOYMENT LAW PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 509 (Aspen Publishers, 2d
Ed. 2011) (“Indeed, discrimination is a term of art that embraces several different
definitions, each with its own distinctive theory and methods of proof.”). Another
related concern is how much courts should actually emphasize this “operation”
element in cases where the disabled plaintiff is seeking to mandate an inaccessible
website’s compliance with Title III by establishing a “nexus” to a public
accommodation—especially when common ownership is lacking. See, e.g., Young, 790
F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
40
Media Center Facts About Redbox, REDBOX, http://www.redbox.com/facts (last
visited Jan. 27, 2012) (alteration in original) (“More than 68 percent of the U.S.
population [lives] within a five-minute drive of a Redbox kiosk . . . .”); see also infra
note 165; discussion infra Part II.E.
41
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
42
See, e.g., Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110; see also discussion infra Part III.A.
43
The Comment has elected to use the name “Backdoor Nexus” for two reasons.
First, a physical door to a brick-and-mortar store and a heavily integrated companion
website, like target.com, are the indisputable ways in which the owner of the
establishment desires its customers to access the store. A separately owned website
that nonetheless affects the goods or services within a brick-and-mortar store can act
as a doorway, but the establishment owner neither controls the site nor anticipates its
customers to use it; hence, the site is a backdoor. Second, the term “backdoor” in a
computer system refers to a method in which the user attempts to bypass normal
authentication while trying to remain undetected—something fitting for the Internet
context.
44
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 946, 949 (N.D. Cal.
2006); see discussion infra Part III.B.1.
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should define the term “operates”—or re-interpret Title III’s publicaccommodation provision—such that a web-based company with a
physical presence in a separately owned place of public
45
accommodation can operate that place for Title III purposes. The
“Backdoor Nexus” approach will ultimately draw a firm distinction
between companies like Facebook with only a virtual presence, which
do not satisfy the approach, and companies like Redbox with a
physical presence in a place of public accommodation, which do
46
satisfy the approach.
Part II of this Comment will provide an overview of “integration”
and the “nexus” approach, including a discussion of the similarities
between Target and Young and the potential complications of
applying the “nexus” approach to a business entity like Redbox. Part
III will examine the ways that courts have defined the term
“operation” in other contexts in order to set out the concepts that the
“Backdoor Nexus” approach incorporates, as well as the approach’s
framework itself. Part IV will illustrate the framework’s application
47
48
using the business structures of Target, Redbox, and Young. Part V
will conclude.
II. OVERVIEW OF “INTEGRATION” AND THE “NEXUS” APPROACH
This section will examine the “nexus” approach’s development,
specifically “integration,” beginning with early decisions applying it in
other contexts. A discussion of Target’s extension of the approach to
websites and the resulting ambiguities will follow, as well as an
assessment of Young, the potential ramifications of a 2012 Redbox
Title III suit, and the reasons that courts must address “integration”
in Title III website litigations.
A. The “Nexus” Approach Before Target
While National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp. was the
45

See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006). The Supreme Court has argued for liberal
construction of public accommodations under the ADA. Leah Poynter, Setting the
Standard: Section 508 Could Have an Impact on Private Sector Web Sites Through the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 19 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 1197, 1222 (2003). This
Comment’s proposed solution will consider whether an entity can operate a
separately owned place of public accommodation based on its presence in that place,
or the fact that it offers services through that place. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
46
See discussion infra Parts IV.B–C, V.
47
Redbox is a seminal example of a scenario involving a web-based company
with a physical presence in a separately owned place of public accommodation. See
discussion infra Parts II.E, IV.B.
48
Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
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landmark case that extended the “nexus” approach to websites, a
number of important decisions preceding it were critical in shaping
49
the analysis.
1. Sufficiency of “Integration” under Stoutenborough
In 1995, the Sixth Circuit considered whether a “nexus” existed
between televised broadcasts of National Football League (NFL)
games, which the NFL blacked out when fan attendance was below a
certain level, and the football stadiums where teams actually played
50
the games. The Sixth Circuit found that the Title III claim failed for
51
two reasons. First, the service was not discriminatory because the
NFL blacked out the broadcasts to both hearing-impaired and
52
hearing-able persons.
Second, while viewers could watch the
broadcasts on a television in a place of public accommodation and
the broadcasts were “certainly offered through defendants, [they were]
53
not offered as a service of [any] public accommodation” The court
clarified that Title III only covers the services “which the public
accommodation offers, not [those] which the lessor of the public
54
accommodation offers . . . .”
Stoutenborough provides a critical aspect of “integration,” which is
the importance of establishing a connection between a challenged
service’s functions and a particular place of public accommodation
55
regardless of who is offering the service.
The mere fact that a
particular defendant leases a place of public accommodation and also
happens to provide a specific service is insufficient to establish a
“nexus”; rather, the service must somehow exemplify that physical
56
place’s purpose.
Therefore, a sufficient degree of “integration”
requires something more than a televised broadcast, which viewers
can watch in one place of public accommodation, of a game that a
49

See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 953–54 (discussing previous
decisions where courts considered the connection between challenged services and
places of public accommodation).
50
Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, 59 F.3d 580, 581–82 (6th Cir. 1995).
51
Id. at 582–83.
52
Id. at 582.
53
Id. at 583 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
54
Id. (alteration in original).
55
Id.
56
Stoutenborough, 59 F.3d at 583; Anderson, supra note 33, at 173 (“The court
ruled that although the football game that the plaintiffs wanted to watch was held in
a place of public accommodation, the television broadcast was not.”). The Sixth
Circuit seemed to contemplate coverage of only tangible barriers; however, this is not
the state of the law today. Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th
Cir. 2002).
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team plays in another place of public accommodation.

2. The Inclusion of Intangible Barriers Under Rendon
The Eleventh Circuit laid the groundwork for the Target court
when it held that Title III’s coverage extended to intangible barriers
58
This decision became
that created discriminatory conditions.
critical to the “nexus” approach’s future applicability to websites
because it established that Title III’s statutory language plainly and
unambiguously covered services that created discrimination from
59
beyond the bricks and mortar of a place of public accommodation.
The challenged service in Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd. was a fastfinger-question telephone-selection process for prospective
60
contestants for the game show “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire.”
The plaintiffs—who were deaf and had upper-body mobility
impairments—were unable to utilize this process to appear on the
game show and brought claims alleging discrimination under Title
61
III.
The Eleventh Circuit found that a substantial “nexus” existed
between the telephone-selection process and the television studio
that housed the game show because the process screened out
disabled individuals who sought the privilege of participating in the
62
game show. In arriving at its decision, the court emphasized that an
intangible space, like a medium of communication, could create
noncompliance with ADA standards when it impaired the right to full
63
and equal enjoyment and participation under Title III.
This
decision moved courts away from the position that only physical or
architectural barriers could create inaccessibility to the goods,
privileges, and services of a place of public accommodation, and
57

Cf. Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1284 (distinguishing Stoutenborough and finding a
sufficient “nexus” between a telephone-selection process and a television studio
where a game show was conducted because the process was an intangible barrier to
the privilege of competing on the show). For more on assessing the possible degrees
of “integration” that can exist, see discussion infra Parts II.D–F.
58
Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1283–84. Intangible barriers consist of eligibility
requirements or screening criteria that hinder enjoyment and participation—or
create a separate benefit—of the goods, services, privileges, etc. of public
accommodations. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (2006).
59
Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1284–86.
60
Id. at 1280. The selection process required prospective contests to call a
specified telephone number and enter responses to a series of pre-recorded
questions using the telephone keypads. Id.
61
Id. at 1281.
62
Id. at 1286.
63
Id. at 1283–84.
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opened the door for the consideration of virtual barriers like the
64
Internet.
3. The Indirect Influence of Access Now
While Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co. is in some ways the
first decision to address Title III’s applicability to the Internet, this
case is aimed more toward an argument that is not the focus of this
65
Comment. The Southern District of Florida explicitly held that a
website cannot itself be considered a place of public
66
accommodation.
But the court never considered the “nexus”
67
argument for two reasons. First, it found that there was no physical
place of public accommodation to connect to the southwest.com
68
website in issue. Second and more importantly, the plaintiffs did not
raise the “nexus” argument until the appeal, and the Eleventh Circuit
was unable to consider a new legal theory due to its limited power of
69
review.
Even though Access Now fell short of addressing the concept of
70
“integration,” paired with Target, it creates a spectrum.
This
spectrum would include Target on one end as an example of a
retailer-companion website that is fully integrated with a brick-and71
mortar store. The plaintiffs’ arguments in Access Now prevented a
64

See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 953–54 (N.D.
Cal. 2006).
65
227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002). The Access Now case is better classified
as part of a group of Title III decisions that suggests a broader definition of the term
“place of public accommodation.” See, e.g., Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d
28 (2d Cir. 1999). Pallozzi centered on the Second Circuit’s consideration as to
whether Title III of the ADA regulates insurance underwriting practices. Id. at 31.
The significance of this decision directly tied into the conception that Title III was
“meant to guarantee more than mere physical access.” Id. at 32; see also Carparts
Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1994).
66
Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1317–19; see also DuPree, supra note 17, at 291
(discussing how Target and Access Now are on opposite ends of a continuum with
regard to the “nexus” approach).
67
The court’s only reference to the “nexus” approach was a simple
acknowledgement of the need for a connection between the service and the place.
Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1320 n.10 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“[S]ome connection between the good or service
complained of and an actual physical place is required.”).
68
Id. at 1321.
69
Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir.
2004).
70
DuPree, supra note 17, at 291. This Comment does not view Access Now as a
true “nexus” case to be on the spectrum of the degrees of “integration”; however, it
views Access Now as a counterpoint to Target in terms of structure or presence of a
business firm.
71
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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determination as to whether the website involved could be a
72
companion website to any physical airline facility. Instead, Access
Now represented an example of an entity that Title III could not
reach—one that only appeared to function online—because the only
73
identifiable space was a virtual one. Therefore, the opposite end of
the spectrum would include completely virtual entities, like Amazon
or Netflix, without any clear presence in an identifiable physical place
74
of public accommodation.
B. Extension of the “Nexus” Approach to Websites Under Target
When the Northern District of California decided Target, it
acknowledged the “nexus” approach for the first time as a judicially
75
created mechanism to bring websites under the auspices of Title III.
Despite being only a district court decision, it was a catalyst for
subsequent Title III suits and strongly influenced major companies to
76
ensure accessibility to their websites. Target established that Title III
covered a website when it acted as a virtual door to accessing the
77
goods and services of a place of public accommodation. A website
could act as a “gateway” when its inaccessibility created a separate
benefit for those able to access it, or prevented full enjoyment or
78
usage of the place’s goods or services to those would could not. The
court premised its finding, that Title III covered intangible barriers
like the Internet, on its interpretation of the statutory language of
Title III, which explicitly specified coverage for the “services of” and
79
not “services in,” a place of public accommodation.
72

Access Now, 385 F.3d at 1329–30.
Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1321. The plaintiffs did not identify any physical
space, such as a Southwest airline facility, because they alleged that southwest.com
denied access to “virtual ticket counters.” Id. Had the plaintiffs originally made the
argument they later presented to the Eleventh Circuit, the Southern District of
Florida could have made a determination as to whether southwest.com could be
considered a companion website, like target.com, to the airline. Access Now, 385 F.3d
at 328.
74
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
75
See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 955 (N.D.
Cal. 2006) (extending the reasoning in Rendon to retailer website and finding a
“nexus” to exist between the site and brick-and-mortar stores).
76
See supra note 21.
77
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 954–55.
78
Id. at 954.
79
Id. at 953–54; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006) (emphasis added) (“No
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns,
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”).
73
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In Target, the court found that target.com’s inaccessibility to
blind customers prevented full and equal enjoyment and usage of
services that the retail stores offered because many benefits of the site
80
were also services of the place of public accommodation. The court
referred to the website as being “heavily integrated” with the brickand-mortar stores based on specific functions, such as the ability to
access information on store locations and hours of operation, order
81
photographs for pick-up, and print coupons to redeem in the store.
The court cautioned, however, that Title III only covered portions of
a website that were directly related to the physical storefront,
82
meaning that it did not cover “online only” products or deals.
C. Ambiguities in the Aftermath of Target
While Target provides a groundbreaking means for disabled
litigants to seek relief under Title III for website inaccessibility, the
court does not provide any concrete steps for implementing its
83
reasoning.
Despite a clear “judicial willingness to bring websites
within the jurisdiction of Title III,” the Target court’s reasoning
creates ambiguity with regard to how much “integration” is needed
and how to apply the “nexus” approach to future situations—even
84
those similar to the facts of Target.
Even though a disabled
individual can use the “nexus” test as a vehicle to combat the
85
hardships of litigating Title III website claims, courts must further
clarify Target’s operative language of “heavily integrated” and
86
“gateway to the store.”
The “nexus” approach remains unclear at a time when Title III
litigation is on the rise mainly because Target does not set forth the
80

Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949, 956. The blind customers were
unable to access target.com because the website’s code could not be translated into
vocalized text via usage of their screen-reader devices. Id. at 949–50.
81
Id. at 949.
82
Id. at 956; see also discussion of Blockbuster infra Part IV.A.1.
83
DuPree, supra note 17, at 290–91 (“While the Ninth Circuit found a nexus in
Target because of integrated services of Target.com and Target stores, it did not state
a rule regarding the degree of integration necessary to find a nexus.”).
84
Id. (alteration in original) (“[While the court displayed a] judicial willingness
to bring websites within the jurisdiction of Title III . . . [it] did not state a rule
regarding the degree of integration necessary to find a nexus.”).
85
Moberly, supra note 19, at 976 (alteration in original) (“[C]ourts have used
the nexus approach to link the types of discrimination prohibited by the ADA with
the places of public accommodation regulated by the statute.”).
86
DuPree, supra note 17, at 291 (alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(“[T]arget provides an unformulated standard and will require other circuits to define
points on the continuum between the endpoints as they address future Title III
claims.”).
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“minimum connection or integration required to find the necessary
“nexus” between a website and public accommodation for Title III to
87
apply.” Target does not consider the point at which “a website [can]
88
become a ‘service’ of the place of public accommodation.”
Additionally, the extension of the Target court’s reasoning specifically
“to retailers with website services less integrated to storefronts
89
remains unclear.” While heavily integrated websites will clearly meet
the “nexus” requirement under Target, the court’s reasoning could
also suggest that “any connection between a store and website that
affects the enjoyment of the goods and services of a store may be
90
sufficient to find a nexus.” More importantly, with regard to the
different types of business structures, Target does not even resolve the
question of whether Title III can cover online-based companies like
Redbox, which have a physical presence in a place of public
91
accommodation.
In addition, Target does not consider whether
virtual companies Netflix or Amazon.com, “which [themselves have]
87

Id. at 301–02. For more on why defining the degree of “integration” matters,
see discussion infra Part II.F.
88
Bashaw, supra note 17, ¶ 13 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
89
DuPree, supra note 17, at 291. Blockbuster, LLC is illustrative of a scenario
where a retailer clearly owns and operates a website that bears less “integration” to its
brick-and-mortar retail stores because consumers primarily utilize its website for a
DVD-by-mail service. See infra text accompanying notes 205–08. This is especially so
when compared to Apple, Inc., which offers the same deals and products on both its
store site and brick-and-mortar stores. See infra text accompanying notes 200–04.
90
DuPree, supra note 17, at 293 (emphasis added). This interpretation could
arguably extend coverage to separately owned websites with a presence in a public
accommodation. Key examples of this could be Redbox and perhaps Facebook
because either websites’ inaccessibility could create a separate benefit, or prevent full
and equal enjoyment of goods and services of a particular public accommodation.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (2006); discussion infra Parts IV.B–C. The
problem here again is the court’s failure to specify a minimum degree of
“integration;” thus, it is a bit unclear whether other courts can even view analogous
business set-ups to that in Target as having a heavily integrated website. See discussion
infra Parts III.B.1, IV.A. Based on the Target court’s examples of acceptable
integrated website functions, however, the “nexus” approach could cover a company
that owns and operates brick-and-mortar stores and a website with “dual functions,”
meaning it offers the same products, deals, store information, or online coupons to
use in the store. See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946,
949 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Examples include Apple, Best Buy, Walmart, and perhaps
Blockbuster because all own and operate websites and brick-and-mortar retail stores
that make available the same products on both the site and the store, as well as have
store locators, coupons, and information on the site. See, e.g., In-Store Coupons,
WALMART, http://coupons.walmart.com/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2012).
91
See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 954–56 (N.D.
Cal. 2006). An entity like Redbox and perhaps Facebook would fall somewhere in
between completely virtual and retailer-companion sites, but arguably closer to
Target. See discussion infra Part IV.
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no physical presence but [do] link to and list products for sites that
do have physical presences, such as Target, must be ADA
92
Such ambiguity is just one of the reasons that this
compliant.”
Comment focuses on redefining the contours of the “nexus”
approach and using a scenario where a website is separately owned,
but appears to act as doorway to a separately owned retail store in a
93
similar manner to the website in Target. Therefore, while Target is a
94
critically important step in the process, it is clearly not the last step.
D. 2011: A Facebook Odyssey
In 2011 courts addressed the “nexus” approach’s ambiguous
state when multiple major corporations were sued under Title III for
95
disability discrimination. Young v. Facebook, Inc. stood out amongst
92

Bashaw, supra note 17, ¶ 13 (alteration in original). Interestingly, Netflix
announced plans for a new way for its Canadian and Latin American customers to
connect to their Facebook accounts via an integrated system, so that customers can
share what they are watching on Netflix and see what their friends are watching all
through Facebook. Tom Willerer, Watch This Now: Netflix and Facebook, NETFLIX U.S.
& CAN. BLOG (Sept. 22, 2011, 10:23AM), http://blog.netflix.com/2011/09/watch
-this-now-netflix-facebook.html. Netflix, like many other big companies, actually uses
Amazon Web Services to power its website. Michael Noer & Nicole Perloth, The
World’s Most Powerful People, YAHOO! FIN. (Nov. 21, 2011, 1:35PM),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/the-world-s-most-powerful-people.html?page=all.
This Comment will not engage in this extra step consideration, meaning whether a
completely removed website can be linked to another website that is sufficiently
integrated to a regulated public accommodation; however, such considerations of an
endless array of deeply complex relationships is just another reason why courts
should establish a minimum degree of “integration” under the “nexus” approach.
93
The fact that Target does not consider at what point a website can become a
service is one of the most troubling ambiguities for both companies with common
ownership of a website and place of public accommodation and for a separately
owned website that could be sufficiently integrated to a public accommodation.
With regards to the latter, the critical inquiry is not only the minimum degree
required but also whether a “nexus” is possible at all; it is clear that this scenario can
exist given companies such as Redbox and Facebook.
94
See DuPree, supra note 17, at 291.
95
In addition to Karen Beth Young’s suit against Facebook, Sony Corporation
was sued under Title III of the ADA pursuant to the “nexus” approach. See Stern v.
Sony Corp., No. CV 09-7710 PA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144042 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8,
2010), aff’d No. 10-55348, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23431 (9th Cir. Nov.17, 2011). The
plaintiff alleged that his visual-processing impairments prevented him from fully
enjoying Sony’s video games, which are played over Internet connections, and thus
also the conventions that Sony holds in connection with such games. Id. at *1, *8–9.
Specifically, the plaintiff argued that a “nexus” existed between the video games and
the conventions because his inability to enjoy and acquire knowledge of the games
had deterred him from attending such conventions. Id. at *8–9. The Stern court
found the Title III claim to fail because the plaintiff did not allege that Sony was
using its games to screen out the disabled from fully enjoying its conventions. Id. at
*9. The court explicitly distinguished both the Rendon and Target cases, finding no
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96

these suits for two primary reasons. First, the plaintiff advanced a
“nexus” argument that reopened website “integration” questions due
97
to its similarity to the argument accepted by the Target court.
Second, the case also generated a new interest in determining
whether a web-based company could “operate” a separately owned
place of public accommodation when its website appeared to meet

allegations of a similar inaccessibility as seen in such cases. Id.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient
“integration” between Sony’s games and a facility owned, leased, or operated by the
company. Stern v. Sony Corp. of Am., No. 10-55348, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23431, at
*2 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 2011). Overall, the Ninth Circuit found that the connection
between video games and marketing events associated with such games was “too
tenuous” despite being hosted by the same company. Id. at *3. This decision
appeared to reaffirm the theory that a challenged service must actually act as an
intangible barrier to entry and not merely as a deterrent to entering a public
accommodation.
The popular web-based rental-service-subscription company Netflix is currently
also involved in a Title III suit as of 2011 for failure to implement closed captioning
for the majority of its movies, which customers “stream instantly” over the Internet.
Terry Baynes, Netflix, Time Warner Sued by U.S. Deaf Groups, REUTERS (June 17, 2011,
6:48PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/17/netflix-lawsuit
-idUSN1711044420110617. Whether Netflix will be subject to liability under Title III
is presently unclear given the ambiguity in the current law and the unique nature of
the Internet-based company. Netflix has further complicated matters by, as of
September of 2011, separating its DVD-by-mail service from its instant streaming
services. At one point, Netflix made an announcement that it would also go as far as
to rename its DVD-by-mail service—where the company began—”Qwikster,” appoint
a new CEO to run Qwikster, create a separate domain name, and force customers to
hold separate accounts regardless of whether they have both services or just one.
Elizabeth A. Harris, Netflix To Break Business in Two, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Sept. 19, 2011,
2:16 AM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/netflix-c-e-o
-apologizes-for-handling-of-price-increase/?ref=elizabethaharris; Reed Hastings, An
Explanation and Some Reflections, NETFLIX U.S. & CAN. BLOG (Sept. 18, 2011, 8:59 PM),
http://blog.netflix.com/2011/09/explanation-and-some-reflections.html.
Effectively, Qwikster would have become a wholly owned subsidiary of Netflix;
however, the company has since scrapped such plans to re-name its DVD-rental
service following extremely negative consumer and economic response. Brian
Stelter, Netflix, In Reversal, Will Keep Its Services Together, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Oct. 10,
2011, 8:00 AM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/10/netflix
-abandons-plan-to-rent-dvds-on-qwikster/.
96
790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011). It should be noted that the challenged
services in the Stern case were the video games, not the Internet connections such
games operate on, and the “nexus” argument advanced did not allege inaccessibility
per se; rather, it alleged a deterrence effect on the ability to fully and equally enjoy the
services of a public accommodation. Stern, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144042, at *8–9. It
is for the latter reason, the deterrence effect, that the court distinguished the Rendon
and Target cases and found the claim to fail. Id. at *9. Additionally, the Netflix Title
III suit is presently on-going and involves an entity that a court is likely to view as
completely virtual, unlike a company like Redbox.
97
See Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115; discussion infra Part II.D.2.
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98

1. Gift Card “Integration”
In Young v. Facebook, Inc., Karen Beth Young alleged that
Facebook deactivated her account because of her bipolar disorder, a
99
Title III-covered disability, and deprived her of full and equal
enjoyment and usage of the gift cards it provides through retail
100
The plaintiff appeared pro se and argued that a “nexus”
stores.
existed under the Target framework because facebook.com was
101
sufficiently integrated with various retail stores across the country.
The plaintiff premised her “integration” argument on the fact that
98

See discussion infra Parts III, IV.B–C. Young serves as the basis for the question
this Comment presents—establishing a “nexus” when a service and a public
accommodation lack common ownership but appear to bear analogous “integration”
to that in Target. Young’s “nexus” argument seems to give rise to the idea of a webbased company with some physical presence in a place of public accommodation. See
infra note 100.
99
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2006).
100
Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(“[S]he contends that the alleged discrimination on Facebook’s website deprives her
of full and equal access to the goods and services provided by Facebook through
physical retail stores.”); Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 2 (alteration in
original) (“Plaintiff has been denied full use and enjoyment of goods and services of
consumer retail stores contracted with Facebook.com [and she] can not participate
in or benefit from merchandise sales and public interactions.”); see also Amy E.
Bivins, Facebook Defeats ADA Suit Involving Account Termination, Site Not “Public
Accommodation, 16 ELEC. COM. & L. REP. (BNA) 887 (2011). Young’s allegation of
discriminatory conduct was grounded in Facebook’s management of her account,
which prevented equal enjoyment of goods and services at brick-and-mortar stores
that sells its gift cards. Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 5. Her specific claim
was that Facebook failed to provide “reasonable customer services to assist individuals
with mental disabilities.” Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
The plaintiff had sent friend requests to thousands of people she believed
would be interested in her advocacy on cancer-related issues, as she had created
several forums and pages on facebook.com. Id. at 1113. Facebook deactivated her
account for the first time for “behavior identified as potentially harassing or
threatening to other Facebook users, including sending ‘friend’ requests to people
she did not know, regularly contacting strangers, and soliciting others for dating or
business purposes.” Id. at 1114. Young made numerous inquiries to Facebook, citing
her bipolar disorder and reasons for engaging in such behavior, but received no
responses. Id. After making a trip from her home in Maryland to Facebook’s
California headquarters, Facebook forced Young to leave a written request, which it
responded to by reactivating her account with a warning. Id. Facebook permanently
deactivated Young’s account for violating its Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities; however, Young was unsatisfied as this was allegedly in response to
her mere request for further clarification and for a personal meeting. Id.; see also
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/legal
/terms (last updated April 26, 2011).
101
Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. As a side note, retail stores are places of
public accommodation under Title III. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006).
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Facebook used such stores for the benefit of selling its gift cards,
which purchasers could only redeem for a virtual currency called
102
Facebook Credits to use for online games and other applications.
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that her account deactivation meant
that, while she could still buy Facebook gift cards from retail stores,
she could no longer use the gift cards because the only way to redeem
103
their value required access to facebook.com.
The plaintiff
referenced Facebook’s advertisement and promotion of its website at
the brick-and-mortar stores to bolster the “integration” argument and
104
the idea that the company had a presence in such stores.
The
plaintiff also listed the Best Buy rewards program as a specific
“integration” example because purchasing a specific value of
Facebook gift cards from Best Buy retail stores gave the member
reward points that could then be used to purchase any store
105
Ultimately, the court was unable to assess the
merchandise.
102

Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115; Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 5.
Facebook, Inc. first announced it would be “coming to a store near you” back in
September 2010. Jon Swartz, Target to Sell Facebook Credits Gift Cards, USA TODAY
(Sept. 1, 2010, 10:01 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2010-09-01target01_ST_N.htm. Facebook, Inc. previously only had arrangements with onlinepayment providers PayPal and MOL, so members could only purchase Facebook
Credits directly from facebook.com. Id. Although Facebook gift cards are now
available in a vast amount of retail stores, the fact that Swartz’s article singles out
Target just makes it all the more bittersweet for the Young decision in the shadow of
Target years earlier. Facebook gift cards—which purchasers can redeem for
“Facebook Credits” to be used in conjunction with member accounts— are not only
available in all of Target’s retail stores but also on Target.com as well. Id.; Facebook
Credits Gift Cards-$25, TARGET, http://www.target.com/p/Facebook-Credits-Gift-Card25/-/A-12906868 (last visited Jan. 27, 2012). Facebook members purchase the gift
cards to use them on facebook.com for “social games, applications and virtual
goods.” Swartz, supra. Facebook defines such credits as “a virtual currency you can
use to buy virtual goods in any games or apps of the Facebook platform that accept
payment.” Help CenterAbout Facebook Credits, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com
/help/?page=132013533539778 (last visited Jan. 27, 2012). Facebook Credits can
now also be used to rent various movies which can be watched on facebook.com.
Facebook Credits Page, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/giftcards.
103
Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 7. Cf. Stern v. Sony Corp., No. CV 097710 PA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144042 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010), aff’d No. 10-55348,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23431 (9th Cir. Nov.17, 2011) (finding deterrence effect was
not enough to constitute deprivation of full and equal enjoyment of usage of goods
or services of places of public accommodation).
104
Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 6.
105
Id. at 5 (emphasis added) (“Facebook, Inc. Gift Card purchases directly
translate to Rewards program points which in turn translate to physical merchandise of
choice for consumers.”); see also Best Buy Reward Zone, BEST BUY,
https://myrewardzone.bestbuy.com/rewarded/;cshid=0sBF0d6fFD9ZVJ3SxBji.5381
(last visited Jan. 27, 2012). This is a prime example of some level of “integration”
between a separately owned websites and places of public accommodation, or even a
commercial presence of the website in the public accommodation, because of the
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“integration” argument because of the plaintiff’s failure to assert
Facebook’s ownership, leasing, or operation of a place of public
106
accommodation—a Title III statutory requirement.
Young was a missed opportunity to ensure consistent application
of the “nexus” approach to websites because the court could have
either bolstered or re-characterized the Target “integration”
107
analysis. If the plaintiff had alleged that Facebook had a presence
in the retail stores that sell its gift cards, and that this somehow
translated into “operation” of such places, then the court may have
been able to consider some of the ambiguity surrounding the
108
necessary degree of “integration” under the “nexus” approach.
Instead, Young was just another example of the unsettling decisions
109
that Title III litigations have produced, especially for pro se litigants.
separate benefit afforded to consumers that are able to redeem the value of storebought gift cards. See DuPree, supra note 17, at 291.
106
Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1116 (emphasis added) (“While the retail stores that
sell Facebook gift cards may be places of accommodation, Young does not allege that
Facebook, Inc. ‘owns, leases (or leases to) or operates’ those stores.”); see also 42
U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006).
107
Compare Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (finding website’s inaccessibility to
deny full and equal enjoyment of and participation in utilizing the value of gift cards
sold by brick-and-mortar stores), with Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F.
Supp. 2d. 946, 954–55 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding website’s inaccessibility to deny the
ability to enjoy all of the services of the brick-and-mortar stores).
108
The plaintiff could have urged the court to interpret the language “affect
commerce” under Title III in a manner to reflect the assertion that Facebook’s
services are provided through retail stores. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006).
Alternatively, she could have argued for a particular definition of “operates” by
looking to other legal contexts. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. It is quite apparent,
however, that Young would not have won on an ownership type of argument as
Facebook does not own any physical retail stores. See Facebook Info. Co. Overview,
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?sk=info (last visited Jan. 27, 2012)
(listing other ways to connect with Facebook, Inc.—none of which indicate any type
of brick-and-mortar store).
109
Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (ruling in favor of attorneys for
national advocacy organization for the blind pursuing Title III claim); see Eagan,
supra note 30. Young was unsettling because the court essentially dismissed the claim
due to an inexperienced pro se litigant’s failure to assert a statutory element. Young,
790 F. Supp. 2d at 1116; Reed v. YMCA, No. 3:07-0765, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119311,
at *1 (M.D. Tenn. 2008); see also Kashmir Hill, California Judge Scoffs at Karen Beth
Young’s Facebook Banning Lawsuit, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2010, 12:33 PM) (alteration in
original), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/ 2010/09/08
/california-judge-scoffs-at-karen-beth-youngs-facebook-banning-lawsuit/
(“[The
judge] voiced extreme skepticism about Young’s complaint . . . explaining in the
order that he has the right to [dismiss] ‘if it appears from the face of the proposed
complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.’”); Kashmir Hill, Maryland
Woman Sues After Being Banned by Facebook, FORBES (Sept. 1, 2010, 1:33 PM), available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2010/09/01/maryland-woman-sues-afterbeing-banned-by-facebook/ (“Since it’s a pro se complaint—Young does not have a
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2. Young’s Analogy to and Potential Reinforcement of
Target
Karen Beth Young may have succeeded in her “nexus” argument
given its analogy—in terms of “integration”—to the argument that
110
the Target court accepted.
In Target, the court found Title III to
cover specific target.com benefits that included the ability to “access
information on store locations and hours, refill a prescription or
order photo prints for pick-up at a store, and print coupons to
111
redeem at a store.”
Similarly, in Young, the plaintiff had argued
that facebook.com allowed its users “to peruse sale items, products,
discounts and other consumer offers,” and that Facebook utilized
promotions and coupons tied to its gift cards both online and in
112
particular retail stores.
More importantly, facebook.com had a
113
store locator so that members could find a local gift card retailer,
which was a function similar to target.com’s information on store
114
locations and hours.
Therefore, Young was to some extent
reconcilable with Target because the “integration” was similarly deep
115
and complex.
While Young’s integration considerations were different in
certain respects from those in Target, it is unlikely that these
differences would have led to the dismissal of the “nexus”—putting
aside the issues of ownership and operation with a web-based
company. Facebook deprived Young of access to its website’s “social
networking” capability, a function that on the surface appeared
distinct from the ability to redeem Facebook gift cards and the
116
alleged discriminatory conduct.
The discriminatory conduct,
however, was indeed connected to the website’s overall functionality
because Facebook intended for the usage of Facebook Credits to
purchase and play games with other members on facebook.com to be
117
a significant part of social networking. When Facebook deactivated
lawyer—it’s a bit messy . . . .”). But see Eric Goldman, Facebook User Loses Lawsuit Over
Account Termination—Young v. Facebook, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (May 19, 2011,
1:29PM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/05/ (noting that the Young
court expressed sympathy for the pro se plaintiff’s circumstances despite its ultimate
dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims).
110
See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949, 956.
111
Id. at 950.
112
Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 7.
113
See Facebook Credits Page, supra note 102.
114
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 950. This was one of the functions
the Target court found Title III to cover. Id.
115
See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
116
Id.
117
See Doug Gross, The Facebook Games That Millions Love (and Hate), CNN TECH
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Karen Beth Young’s account it not only took away her ability to write
118
119
120
a wall post, poke, or make a status update, but also took away
her ability to purchase Facebook Credits online, use them for games,
121
and find or redeem the value of gift cards. While Young then had
no reason to purchase gift cards from stores, the remaining one
billion plus members purchased and utilized the value of the cards
122
without issue. Even though Facebook offered different methods for
the purchase of Facebook Credits—store gift cards versus
123
facebook.com—users ultimately sought the same item. Therefore,
the account deactivation created an intangible barrier to the
enjoyment of a good because, while Young could purchase Facebook
124
Credits in stores, she could not use them at all. This is exactly the
125
type of discrimination that Title III’s drafters aimed to prevent.
E. Redbox as a Potential Bridge from Target to Young
Courts may have a new opportunity to clarify both “integration”
and “operation” under the “nexus” approach because a blind
advocacy group filed a Title III suit in 2012 against Redbox, a
(Feb. 23, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-02-23/tech/facebook.games_1_markpincus-video-games-facebook?_s=PM:TECH (discussing overwhelming popularity of
social-gaming). But see Tricia Duryee, Not that Many People Play Facebook Games After
All, ALL THINGS DIGITAL (Oct. 18, 2011, 2:17 PM), http://allthingsd.com/20111018
/not-that-many-people-play-facebook-games-after-all/ (discussing how Facebook’s
shift from counting visitors to only counting actual authorized users when assessing
data on how many members play its games shows much less active users).
118
Kevin Der, Facebook Is Off-The-Wall, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (July 27, 2007,
10:05PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=3532972130.
119
Michael Arrington, 85% of College Students Use Facebook, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 7,
2005), http://techcrunch.com/2005/09/07/85-of-college-students-use-facebook/.
120
Claire Suddath, Facebook Wants to Read Your Mind, TIME (Mar. 13, 2009),
available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1885010,00.html.
121
Help Center Purchasing Facebook Credits, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com
/help/147215735350834/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (alteration in original) (“You
can purchase Facebook Credits directly from within an app . . . [or] go to the
Payments tab in your Account Settings.”).
122
See Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 7 (“Facebook, Inc. denies Plaintiff
access to goods, services and information made available by retail stores by
preventing Plaintiff from being a registered member of Facebook.”); see also Guynn,
supra note 29.
123
See Amended Complaint, supra note 31 at 7; Swartz, supra note 102.
124
See discussion of Facebook “integration” under the “Backdoor Nexus”
approach infra Part IV.C.
125
See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)–(b) (2006); Mook, supra note 7, at 6 (alteration in
original) (citing Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 955
(N.D. Cal. 2006)) (“Title III of the ADA [does] not create a dichotomy between
‘those services which impede physical access to a public accommodation and those
merely offered by a facility.’”).
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company that operates through both a website and interactive kiosks
126
While Redbox’s interactive kiosks are the
residing in retail stores.
challenged service in this case, as opposed to redbox.com, the court’s
ultimate decision may provide an answer to the minimum
“integration” that the “nexus” approach requires, as well as whether a
web-based company with a physical presence can “operate” a place of
127
public accommodation. The court can address the required degree
of “integration,” and then apply that determination to future
litigation involving redbox.com, because the plaintiffs allege that the
128
kiosks are “services of” the retail store spaces that Redbox controls.
Even though Redbox does not own a physical space, the court can
also address “operation” because the company’s kiosks give it a clear
129
presence in a portion of a physical space that it controls.
Redbox
therefore may act as a bridge between Target and Young because it is
one step above a “companion website” like Target, but one step below
130
a completely virtual space like Amazon or perhaps Facebook.
F. Why the Degree of “Integration” Matters
Since the Target court, like Title III’s drafters, does not specify
the required degree of “integration,” current application of its
reasoning remains challenging even to analogous scenarios like
131
Young or Redbox. It is critical to resolve the uncertainties
126

Compl. for Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101, et. seq., the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, et. seq., and the
California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54–54.3, Lighthouse for the Blind
and Visually Impaired v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, No. C12-00195 LB (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 12, 2012), available at www.dralegal.org/downloads/cases/Redbox
/Complaint.doc [hereinafter Redbox Complaint]; see discussion infra Part IV.B.
127
Redbox Complaint, supra note 126.
128
Id. at 10. The critical inquiry is not whether any relationship exists between
Redbox and the retail stores or supermarkets where its kiosks happen to reside;
rather, it is the existence of a portion of a Redbox-controlled physical space that is
vital to both the “integration” and “operation” inquiries. See discussion infra Part
III.A.2.ii.
129
See Redbox Complaint, supra note 126, at 10. Note, however, the plaintiffs in
the Redbox 2012 litigation also allege the kiosks themselves are places of public
accommodation. Id. In conjunction with its filing of a motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ claim, co-defendant Save Mart Supermarket actually argues that it does not
control the particular spaces that it provides to Redbox for the rental kiosks, thus
supporting the notion that Redbox “operates” a portion of a place of public
accommodation. Lighthouse for the Blind and Visually Impaired v. Redbox
Automated Retail, LLC, No. C12-0195, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70007, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
May 18, 2012). The Northern District of California has since denied Save Mart’s
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id. at *12–13.
130
See discussion infra Part IV; infra Figure 1.
131
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006); Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110,
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surrounding the necessary degree of “integration” because
computers today can provide a virtual door to both business
structures like that of Target, and also to web-based companies with
some
kind
of
presence
in
a
place
of
public
132
accommodations. Refinement of the “nexus” approach with greater
attention paid to defining the required degree of “integration” is
especially necessary when it is unclear whether a particular website
can be classified as a service of a public accommodation, as a result of
either questions of ownership and control or the business
133
enterprise’s structure.
If courts do not modify the “nexus” approach, then Title III’s
application to inaccessible business websites will often depend on
134
“judicial interpretation[s] of Target.”
Such interpretations would
focus on defining the degree of “integration” in a specific case, but
135
without any type of specific factors to consider.
The danger in
relying upon judicial interpretation of Target without a specific set of
criteria is the possibility of inconsistent results for virtually identical
business/website set-ups and the potential finding that Title III does
not cover websites with a physical presence in a public
136
If, however, courts use Target’s Title III-covered
accommodation.
1115 (N.D. Cal. 2011); DuPree, supra note 17, at 291.
132
Application of the Target court’s reasoning to virtually identical scenarios, as
well as the extension to web-based companies that nonetheless have a physical
presence in a public accommodation, is unclear and troublesome. For example,
Apple and Blockbuster have set-ups akin to that of Target, in that the former
companies both own and operate brick-and-mortar stores across the country and a
companion website. See discussion infra Part IV.A. Utilizing the Target court’s
example of Title III-covered website functions alone, it appears that a plaintiff could
establish a “nexus” for such set-ups if these websites ever became inaccessible to the
disabled. But whether the Target court’s examples alone will constitute sufficient
“integration” is an inference at best because the court did not specify a minimum
degree of information. DuPree, supra note 17, at 290–91.Blockbuster is perhaps a
weaker example than Apple because even though Blockbuster operates a DVD-bymail service analogous to Netflix that customers can manage online, it is stronger
than Netflix because of the unitarily owned brick-and-mortar Blockbuster stores. See
supra note 89. Whether or not Target would fit a scenario where blockbuster.com is
less integrated to its brick-and-mortar counterparts is unclear without elaboration of
the language in Target. But see discussion infra Part IV.A.
133
See Bashaw, supra note 17, ¶ 13. “Business enterprise’s structure” refers either
to retailers with both brick-and-mortar stores and a companion website or to webbased businesses with some physical presence in a public accommodation.
134
DuPree, supra note 17, at 293 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
135
See id.
136
See id. at 293–94. Even moving beyond the ownership issues in Young, it is
difficult to tell if, despite its similarities to Target, the Young court would have
correctly applied Target for the “integration” element to reflect such similarities when
the defendant is a web-based company with a physical presence—as opposed to a
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website functions and other similar types of functions, then a
spectrum of the possible degrees of “integration” will account for
137
these entities.
Defining the “nexus” approach with greater specificity will avoid
a misinterpretation that leads to a web-based company with a physical
presence like Redbox being grouped with completely virtual entities
138
such as Amazon or Netflix that already fall outside of Title III.
Doing so will also help clarify Title III’s applicability to a company
like Facebook because courts could view such an entity as either
completely virtual or just another example of a website with less
139
“integration” to a physical space. Therefore, courts should carefully
refine the “nexus” approach and make “integration” a top priority
when assessing whether a “nexus” exists because the approach’s
purpose is to link the website to a place of public accommodation
when inaccessibility to the former can impede enjoyment of or
140
participation in the latter.
While defining the degree of “integration” is critical, defining it
does not complete the “nexus” inquiry because Target does not
account for another Title III problem that the Young court faced:
141
ownership/operation/leasing.
Courts must consider this other
brick-and-mortar company with a secondary website.
137
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (N.D. Cal.
2006); see infra Part IV.A. This point ties in directly to the aforementioned concerns
regarding application of Target not only to web-based companies, or websites one
step removed from their brick-and-mortar companions, but to businesses with
virtually identical set-ups in the absence of a specified degree of “integration”
needed. See DuPree, supra note 17, at 290–91.
138
See DuPree, supra note 17, at 301–02.
139
See id. at 291; see also discussion infra Part IV.C. The suggestion that
facebook.com cannot even have some type of a physical presence in a public
accommodation is a bit draconian given its pervasiveness all over the world.
Facebook has even been called an addiction or compulsion due to its overwhelming
influence on everyday life. See Elizabeth Cohen, Five Clues That You are Addicted to
Facebook, CNN HEALTH (Apr. 23, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-04-23/health
/ep.facebook.addict_1_facebook-page-facebook-world-social-networking?_s=PM
:HEALTH (alteration in original) (“[T]herapists say they’re seeing more and more
people . . . who’ve crossed the line from social networking to social dysfunction.”).
140
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 954–55.
141
See id. at 949 (noting how Target owns and operates both the brick-and-mortar
store locations and target.com, and therefore not addressing the Title III
requirement of ownership, operation, or leasing). Young is valuable not only due to
its intriguing “integration” argument but also because it presents both an argument
for “integration” and questions surrounding the element of common ownership and
operation. Young demonstrates the need to define and assess the level of emphasis
for the requirement of “operation” under Title III—specifically when the unique
nature of the Internet is implicated— as this was arguably the “straw that broke the
camel’s back” in said case. Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1116
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element because, in addition to its presence in Title III’s statutory
language and its potential to bolster the “nexus” test, the failure to
agree on a consistent interpretation of “operation” can still hinder a
142
“nexus” claim, even with a clear depiction of “integration.” The way
in which courts define this requirement when a web-based entity’s
site creates a virtual door to a store—a door that the retailer does not
143
own—will determine the entity’s Title III status.
III. “OPERATION” AND THE “BACKDOOR NEXUS” APPROACH
Since there is presently no case law specifying factors to consider
when a noncompliant virtual space creates a doorway to a separately
owned physical space that is compliant, this section will first address
the different ways that courts have defined “operation” through
144
generalized approaches and analogous contexts.
This initial
discussion will introduce concepts that this Comment’s proposed
145
standard ultimately incorporates.
This section will then set forth
the “Backdoor Nexus” approach’s two-prong framework, beginning
with “integration” and then “operation.”
A. Defining “Operation”
1. General Approaches
Generalized approaches to defining “operation” will not, by
themselves, account for web-based entities because the Internet is a
146
dynamic and complex medium of communication.
Courts often
(N.D. Cal. 2011).
142
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006); discussion infra Part III.A.2.
143
See discussion infra Parts III.B, IV.
144
See supra note 26; see also infra Figure 1. This Comment will give primary
attention to Title III’s “operation” requirement in order to maintain focus on the
disparate-ownership scenario—as seen in Young. This is not meant to suggest that
ownership or leasing is any less important but rather that courts will be more likely to
scrutinize “operation,” and “operation” is a better fit for this scenario. Moreover, as a
general matter Title III does not accord any type of elevated status for ownership.
Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 872–73 (9th
Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (“[L]imiting the reach of the
statute to owners . . . would conflict with § 42 U.S.C. 12182(b) . . . .”); Leonard v.
Israel Discount Bank, 967 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (emphasis added) (“The
legislative history of the ADA confirms that Title III, as its plain meaning tells us, was
intended to regulate owners and lessees of places of public accommodation.”).
145
See discussion infra Parts III.A.2–B.
146
See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?:
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (Oxford Univ. Press, 2006) (discussing the neverending clashes between the Internet as a communication medium and the
governmental attempts to regulate it). In these circumstances, the absence of a
definition of an explicit statutory term—”operates”— is just as troublesome as an

KEDDIS (DO NOT DELETE)

870

3/28/2013 4:14 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:843

utilize dictionary definitions as a default measure for defining legal
terms; however, such definitions are insufficient because they often
147
The term “operate” is no exception
generate more questions.
because its plain meaning is “to control or direct the functioning of,”
but there is no indication as to what constitutes “control” or
“direction” nor how much control or direction is sufficient to
148
constitute “operation.”
To deal with the problems inherent in
dictionary definitions, courts often attempt to supplement dictionary
149
They generally
definitions by utilizing broad agency principles.
focus on authoritative and discretionary factors, as well as the right to
150
control and the appearance of control.
But the specific context
ambiguous judicial term already mentioned—”integration.” This Comment will not
only assess the sufficiency of the degree of “integration” through comparisons to
analogous and dissimilar business set-ups along a spectrum, but will also evaluate the
possible definitions of “operates” through comparisons to other scenarios.
147
Courts that take the dictionary approach construe a term “in accord with its
ordinary and natural meaning.” E.g., Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063,
1066 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 931 (Rev. ed.
1980)) (“To ‘operate’, in the context of a business operation, means ‘to put or keep
in operation.’”). The exact issue in Neff was whether American Dairy Queen’s
“contractual rights under the . . . franchise agreement demonstrate that ADQ
‘operates’ the San Antonio Stores.” Id. at 1065. The court was hesitant to “bend
‘operates’ too far beyond its natural meaning . . . .” Id. at 1069.
148
Id. at 1066 (alteration in original) (citing WEBSTER’S II: NEW RIVERSIDE
UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 823 (1988)); Dahlberg v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 92 F.
Supp. 2d 1091, 1102 (D. Colo. 2000).
149
See, e.g., Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861,
874–78 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding the term “operates” to be very expansive,
considering the distinction between public and private ownership, examining the
level of control exercised, and discussing the effect of a short-term operation of a
public accommodation).
150
See, e.g., Dahlberg, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (finding control over “day-to-day
operations” to be a factor for Title III “operation” ); Coddington v. Adelphi Univ., 45
F. Supp. 2d 211, 215 (E.D. NY 1999) (“The term ‘operate’ has been interpreted as
being in a position of authority and having the power and discretion to perform
potentially discriminatory acts.”); see also Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 77 (N.D.
Ohio 1994); Reed v. YMCA, No. 3:07-0765, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119311, at *4 (M.D.
Tenn. July 22, 2008) (considering factors of “operation” such as organization
documents, direction of operations, or direct involvement in the wrongful conduct).
Courts typically focus on such factors in the franchisor liability context. See Kathleen
Pearson, Let’s All Go to the Dairy Queen Without Margo!: The Liability of Franchisors Under
Title III of the Americans with Disability Act After Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp.,
101 DICK. L. REV. 137, 145–47 (1996) (discussing how the right to control the work of
an agent is critical, that establishment of such relationship is a matter of fact, and
that apparent agency is another consideration courts could use to impose liability if
the customer reasonably relied on the franchisee’s apparent authority); see also
discussion infra Part III.A.2. For a more in-depth overview of agency conceptions in
the franchisor context, including the typical control factors that courts consider, see
Randall K. Hanson, The Franchising Dilemma Continues: Update on Franchisor Liability for
Wrongful Acts by Local Franchisees, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 91, 93–98 (1997). While
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often dictates the determination and application of such factors.
Therefore, in order to fill the gaps left open by these general
approaches, courts should use concepts derived from analogous
152
contexts to define “operation” in the Internet context.
2. Concepts Derived from Analogous Contexts

With the increasing complexity of a web-based company’s
structure, it is important to consider concepts from scenarios that
involve two separately owned entities whose businesses nonetheless
153
become intertwined.
i. Specific Control Over the Demanded Modification
A plaintiff can establish “operation” of a noncompliant place of
public accommodation under Title III upon a showing of specific
154
control over the inaccessible service or the demanded modification.
This type of “operation” primarily exists in the franchising context
which, despite invoking the same statutory authority, has yet to

customers are aware that, for example, Redbox is a separate company from Shop
Rite, customers are likely to at least assume that the companies have some type of
business relationship that allows Redbox kiosks to occupy a particular portion of
supermarket, and that Redbox is responsible for that particular area. See discussion
infra Parts III.B.2.ii, IV.B.
151
See Pearson, supra note 150, at 143 (discussing how the Department of Justice
has supported the theory of extending liability to the franchisor by arguing that ADA
operator status is a question of fact).
152
Unique mediums create unique forms of discrimination—closing a virtual
door to a store or creating a separate benefit—that warrant different theories. See
GLYNN, ANROW-RICHMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 39, at 509.
153
See Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 793 (8th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that the “degree of interrelation
between the operations” of two entities is a critical factor for determining whether
they are actually operating as one entity); Richards, supra note 11, at 521 (“Some
commentators have predicted the Internet becoming the absolute standard for
businesses . . . .”). The “nexus” argument in Young implicated a connection between
two distinct entities—Facebook and a separately owned commercial retail store.
Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2011). The
aforementioned Netflix 2011 announcement regarding the formation of Qwikster is
a prime example of the overlap between role of the corporate form and the unique
nature of the Internet. See supra note 95.
154
Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 1066–67 (5th Cir. 1995); Nat’l
Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., No. 11-CV-30168, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84518, at
*11 (D. Mass. June 19, 2012) (citations omitted). Neff employs a “prevalent theor[y
for determining] who is an operator under the ADA.” United States v. Days Inn, 22
F. Supp. 2d 612, 616 (E.D. KY 1998) (alteration in original); see also Pearson, supra
note 150, at 138 (Neff is a “test case on the liability of franchisors under Title III.”).
For further background of Neff and the liability of franchisors under Title III of the
ADA, see generally Pearson, supra note 150.
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155

overlap with Title III website litigation. Courts have not considered
this type of “operation” in the Internet context because franchising
cases generally involve a physical barrier to only one space—a
156
noncompliant physical place of public accommodation.
Title III
Internet cases involve two spaces, one physical and one virtual, but
the demanded modification in these cases is located in the virtual
157
space—as opposed to in the place of public accommodation.
Adapting this aspect of “operation” into the “Backdoor Nexus”
approach, however, will ensure that the nature of the barrier and the
number of spaces involved do not circumvent liability in
158
contravention of Title III’s statutory language.
Thus, if a plaintiff
155

Unlike Title III franchising litigation, Title III website litigation has had a clear
disparity in results. Compare Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d
946 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding Title III to cover inaccessible website), with Young, 790
F. Supp. 2d 1110 (dismissing Title III claim involving inaccessible website without
considering the merits of the “nexus” argument), and Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest
Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (finding Title III to be
inapplicable to inaccessible website).
156
There does not appear to be any Title III case that implicates franchising
relationships and intangible discriminatory barriers; the majority of such cases
implicate only physical or architectural barriers. E.g., Neff, 58 F.3d 1063; Lieber v.
Macy’s West, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 1999). This is surprising
considering that the Internet has a commanding presence, as it now provides society
with virtual goods, services, currencies, and even doors. For example, Facebook
Credits are “a virtual currency you can use to buy virtual goods in any games or apps of
the Facebook platform . . . .” Help Center About Facebook Credits, FACEBOOK, supra note
102 (emphasis added). Also, target.com acts as a door to the brick-and-mortar
Target retail stores. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 955 (“The challenged
service here is heavily integrated with the brick-and-mortar stores and operates in
many ways as a gateway to the stores.”). Moreover, another reason courts may not
have extended this definition of “operation” is the fact that there is currently no
scenario where a web-based company has entered into some type of franchising
arrangement. But this scenario is possible down the line because web-based
companies like Amazon have been branching out in recent years, beyond the
traditional online order/warehouse system. See, e.g., Michael Noer & Nicole Perloth,
supra note 92 (noting how Amazon is “exerting increasing power over the publishing
business through the Kindle,” which several major retail stores like Target sell).
Further, there already exists a chain of brick-and-mortar stores called “iSold It” that
sell merchandise on the web-based company eBay through the stores.
157
E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946.
158
See Kenneth Kronstadt, Looking Behind the Curtain: Applying Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act to the Businesses Behind Commercial Websites, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 111, 131 (2007) (“Title III does not require that the public must physically enter
any such ‘place’ to be protected against discrimination.”). Rendon and Target both
explicitly state that Title III covers intangible barriers to a place of public
accommodation, and, therefore, the discrimination’s nature and location cannot
defeat a claim that demonstrates sufficient “integration.” See supra Parts II.A.2, B.
Further, the Neff court held that, although outside the scope of a Title III franchising
case, control of “non-structural” aspects—e.g. accounting, trademarks, etc.—”may be
relevant in other contexts . . . [if it relates] to the allegedly discriminatory
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can demonstrate a defendant’s ownership or control of the
noncompliant virtual space that is now a “service of” the physical
space, then the control that is exercised over that space may carry
over to the physical space—so long as a plaintiff can first satisfy
159
“integration.”
ii. Limited Occupation
Commercial landlord-tenancy contributes an important step to
defining “operation” because the nature of an occupant’s association
with the discriminatory conditions is more important than the
160
duration of the occupation and the size of the space. Under Title
III, either a landlord, its temporary tenant, or both can be
responsible for ADA compliance of a place of public accommodation,

conditions . . . .” Neff, 58 F.3d at 1067 (alteration in original); see also Pearson, supra
note 150, at 144. This Comment will adapt the specific-control concept to fit the
disparate-ownership scenario because courts in Title III franchising cases typically
consider whether a non-owning entity has “in some way actually cause[d] the [owner]
to comply or not to comply with the ADA.” Days Inn, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 616
(alteration in original) (emphasis added).
While some commentators take the view that holding franchisors liable would
provide a possible disincentive for the franchisee to comply with the ADA, this point
only has muster when it is the franchisee who has failed to comply with the ADA. See
Pearson, supra note 150, at 143. When the entity that a plaintiff is attempting to hold
liable under Title III is the one who has failed to comply with the mandates of the
ADA, then this point is clearly inapplicable; in Young, it was Facebook itself, while not
a “franchisor,” which created the alleged discriminatory condition. Young, 790 F.
Supp. 2d at 1114. As a side note, if a case implicates a parent-subsidiary relationship,
courts are similarly loath to extend liability to the parent company; however, if the
parent is “linked to the alleged discriminatory action,” then it can be held liable.
Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 795 (8th Cir. 2009).
159
See discussion infra Part III.B. The Neff court considered whether limited
control over a franchisee store could translate into “operation” under Title III. Neff,
58 F.3d at 1066. Traditionally, the entity controlling a service of a place of public
accommodation also controls the place itself. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F.
Supp. 2d 946. It is unclear, relying upon Neff alone, what will happen when the
demanded modification is not actually part of the place of public accommodation.
For example, in Young, the demanded modification was access to the website
facebook.com. Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. Even though Facebook owned the
service, the plaintiff alleged that the inaccessibility affected a good sold in a
separately owned retail store. Id. It may be the case that “integration” and
“operation” are intertwined under this standard from Neff, such that if the demanded
modification is actually off-site, but nonetheless connected to the public
accommodation, then the claim is successful. See discussion infra Parts IV.B–C. In
other words, if a separately owned service bears a “nexus” to a place of public
accommodation, then the idea is that the entity controlling the service, which is
creating the discriminatory conditions, can “operate” the place if other criteria are
met.
160
See supra note 36. Normally the landlord-tenant context is more suitable for
the lease requirement of Title III. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006).
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depending on who creates the discriminatory condition and whether
they are using the occupied or controlled space to engage in
161
commerce. Likewise, the Supreme Court supports the proposition
that “under [Title III], a place of public accommodation may be
‘operated’ by entities who do not own the facility and use it for a
162
limited time period only.”
Courts can hold a non-owning entity
liable as an operator so long as the entity uses a place of public
accommodation during the same time period in which the
163
discriminatory conditions occur.
The conception that an entity can operate a place for a limited
time begets the important consideration as to whether, like a leasing
tenant, a web-based company can engage in commerce through a
164
limited space of a place of public accommodation under Title III.
161

See Botosan v. Fitzhugh, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1053–54 (S.D. Cal. 1998)
(“Under the ADA, liability attaches to landlords and tenants alike.”); 28 C.F.R. §
36.201(b) (2011) (alteration in original) (“[The ADA covers] both the landlord who
owns the building that houses a place of public accommodation and the tenant who
owns or operates the place of public accommodation . . . .”); AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL COVERING PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS AND COMMERCIAL FACILITIES, III-1.2000.B (1994 Supp.),
[hereinafter “TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL”], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman3up.html (“The fact that a landlord in a
particular case is not covered by the ADA does not necessarily negate Title III’s
coverage of private entities that lease or operate places of public accommodation
within the facility.”); Paul V. Sullivan, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: An
Analysis of Title III and Applicable Case Law, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1117, 1127 (1995)
(“Both parties remain subject to liability.”).
162
Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 874
(9th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (discussing PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S.
661 (2001)). Under the ADA, “operation” is an extensive term that includes
“‘sublesses, management companies, and any other entity that . . . operates a place of
public accommodation, even if the operation is for a short time.’” Id. (alteration in
original) (emphasis added) (citing 28 C.F.R., ch 1, pt. 35, app. B, at 628 (1999)).
163
Dahlberg v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1105 (D. Colo.
2000). With a workable definition of “operates,” the Young court could have held
Facebook liable if it had a presence in retail stores during the time of the alleged
discriminatory conduct. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
164
See, e.g., Disabled Rights Action Comm., 375 F.3d at 878. In this case, the Ninth
Circuit considered whether the Las Vegas Events group “operated” the publicaccommodation center when it sponsored rodeos; effectively, the group was
operating a whole space but during a limited time. Id. Courts would have to
recognize that the size of such space is not dispositive when considering whether an
entity’s operations affect commerce in a place of public accommodation. The ADA’s
public-accommodation provision explicitly requires the engaging of commerce
through the particular space irrespective of the size of such space. 42 U.S.C. §
12181(7) (2006).
As a business entity’s structure has evolved, so has its ability to affect
commerce. See supra note 6. With the nature of web-based companies and the
current ambiguities surrounding “integration,” the “nexus” approach will become a
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For example, many web-based companies have a “presence” in places
of public accommodation, but such presence is more apparent in
companies like Redbox that use a physical mechanism to provide
165
services, as opposed to more virtual companies that do not. These
companies create discriminatory conditions that may impact a limited
space that they occupy or control, but that another company owns;
166
this is in some ways likened to the landlord and tenant scenario.
There is no current authority that directly addresses the
“operation” of a limited space, like part of a retail store; however,
167
pertinent Title III sources may support the theory.
A place of
mere illusion if it is not refined. On the other end, there is a concern for placing less
emphasis on “operation” based on a plain reading of Title III. Pickern v. Pier 1
Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (“The
statute says nothing about liability by persons who could operate a place of public
accommodation.”); see also Pearson, supra note 150, at 148 (distinguishing franchisor
liability under Title VII from liability under the ADA because the ADA “bases liability
on status as an operator”). Greater emphasis on the requirement of “operation” may
be better left for those arguments where a plaintiff asserts that a website is a place of
public accommodation itself. E.g., Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F.
Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
165
Redbox is one such example of operating a limited space because its business
structure is built around rental kiosks that Redbox owns and operates but that are
located within a particular part of a retail store—a regulated public accommodation.
Media Center Facts About Redbox, supra note 40. Additionally, courts can apply the
“nexus” approach to concrete spaces like airline ticket counters; however, there is no
disparate-ownership scenario regarding a ticket counter and surrounding airline
facility. See Khouri, supra note 2, at 338 (discussing the Access Now case). It is more
difficult to establish a physical presence for companies like Facebook and Amazon
because they provide trademarked goods in retail stores as opposed to setting up a
physical mechanism to retrieve such goods or services.
166
E.g., Lighthouse for the Blind and Visually Impaired v. Redbox Automated
Retail, LLC, No. C12-0195, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70007, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 18,
2012) (“Save Mart does not control the design or operation of the kiosks, and has no
power to change them.”); see supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text; see also
discussion infra Part IV.
167
See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2011). Regardless of the presence of sources, it is
nearly impossible to imagine a world where “temporary” does not include limited
spaces that could subject such entities to Title III liability. If the overarching space of
the place of public accommodation is the only area subject to Title III regulation,
this may create a complete risk allocation to the public accommodation’s owner for
all discriminatory conduct occurring within any sub-divisions. “Operation” of a
limited space may be akin to leasing an office space in a building or corporate park.
See TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 161 (setting forth an example
where Title III covers private entities that rent and operate spaces as retail stores in a
building owned by an executive agency). Operators of a small space such as an office
within a corporate park could escape liability through such sub-division, and the risk
would be shifted completely to the building owner. Such shifting would contravene
the landlord-tenant regime under Title III wherein both a landlord and tenant can
be subject to Title III liability. See Botosan v. Fitzhugh, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1053–54
(S.D. Cal. 1998); 28 C.F.R. § 36.201(b) (2011).
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public accommodation is a “facility, operated by a private entity,
168
whose operations affect commerce,” and the Code of Federal
Regulations defines a “facility” to include “all or any portion of
169
buildings [or] structures . . . .”
Moreover, the ADA can classify
170
specific portions of a business as a place of public accommodation.
Incorporating this concept into the proposed framework will allow
for an entity like Redbox, which links its website to the kiosks that
provide its rental services, to “operate” a limited space of a public
accommodation because its kiosks physically occupy part of that
171
place.
Redbox can essentially serve as a “bridge” to unite Title III
franchising cases with the Internet context, especially in a scenario
like Young.

168

§ 12181(7).
§ 36.104 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
170
GOREN, supra note 6, at 68, 146. Furthermore, when a “portion of a facility
containing a primary function is altered, the path of travel to that portion . . . must
also be made readily accessible . . . .” Id. at 72. The term “primary function” is
defined as a “major activity for which the facility is intended . . . .” Id. (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The concept of separating limited
spaces within one encompassing space has also been suggested in the private
residency context. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.207(a) (2011) (alteration in original)
(emphasis added) (“[T]he portion of the residence used exclusively as a residence is
not covered . . . but that portion used exclusively in the operation of the place of public
accommodation or that portion used both for the place of public accommodation
and for residential purposes is covered . . . .”).
171
See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
169
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Figure 1: The Four Quadrants of Title III Liability
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B. “Backdoor Nexus” Framework for Establishing “Integration” and
“Operation”
This section sets forth the proposed two-prong analysis for the
“Backdoor Nexus” approach. The first prong—”integration”—urges
courts to re-characterize Target by adopting a totality of the
circumstances approach because they have been unable to
consistently apply the ambiguous concept of “integration” to similar
176
factual scenarios.
Utilizing such an approach will force courts to
172

This figure portrays all of the scenarios under Title III that implicate the two
types of spaces—physical and virtual—that are commonly involved and the issues of
unitary versus separate ownership and operation. See infra notes 173–74.
173
Most Title III claims have involved a single entity that owns or controls a
physical space; however, many Title III claims have also involved an entity that
controls but does not own a physical space. E.g., Disabled Rights Comm. v. Las Vegas
Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2004); Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d
1063 (5th Cir. 1995).
174
In the Internet context, plaintiffs have used the “nexus” approach to establish
Title III claims against an entity that owns and controls both a physical and virtual
space (the virtual space being the retailer website which acts as another “door” to the
store). E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal.
2006). The question arises, however, whether the “nexus” approach can allow Title
III to reach a separately owned or controlled virtual space that also appears to act as
a “door” to a physical space; this is the question that this Comment considers.
175
Redbox may be the bridge to the “separately owned noncompliant virtual with
compliant physical spaces” quadrant because it is a company with both a website and
physical kiosks in places of public accommodation. Redbox may be one step above
Target but one step below Young. See application of “Backdoor Nexus” approach infra
Part IV.B.2.
176
The Target court found a sufficient “nexus” because the challenged service was
heavily integrated with, and operated as a gateway to, the brick-and-mortar stores.
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 955. But the court did not further elaborate
on how future courts can determine whether such “integration” exists between a
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scrutinize websites with functions that are similar to target.com, even
if such sites only have a physical presence in a separately owned
177
public accommodation.
The second prong—”operation”—will use the specific control
and limited occupation concepts to collectively set forth a definition
that courts can apply to web-based companies. This interpretation
will dynamically reflect the commercial presence that these entities
can have in a place of public accommodation in order to prevent
them from having “carte blanche to discriminate against persons with
178
disabilities when selling their goods and services.”
179

1. First Prong: “Integration”

i. The Target Factors as a Sliding Scale
Courts should explicitly adopt the Target court’s examples of
Title III-covered website functions as a checklist or sliding scale in
order to account for the inherent variability of a totality of the
180
circumstances approach. Each of these functions has an element of
website and a public accommodation. See id. Moreover, it is unclear whether the
website must act as an actual virtual door, or merely if it must have a strong
connection to the place of public accommodation. See supra Part II.C.
177
Compare Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(not considering the “nexus” argument because of the plaintiff’s failure to assert an
argument regarding ownership, leasing, or operation, in spite of facebook.com
having information on store locations and hours where it sells its gift cards and
serving as the location where customers must redeem the value of store-bought gift
cards), with Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949 (finding target.com—a site
that Target indisputably owned and operated—to be sufficiently integrated with
Target retail stores because customers could obtain store location and hours
information, refill prescriptions, order photographs for in-store pick-up, and print
coupons to redeem at stores).
178
GOREN, supra note 6, at 128. This Comment takes the position that courts
have not been dynamically interpreting Title III’s public-accommodations provision
to preserve the statute’s purpose in the face of evolving technology. See Carparts
Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1994)
(explaining that the congressional intent is for Title III to keep the disabled in the
“social mainstream”). The phrase “dynamically interpreting” is not meant to indicate
that virtual places should themselves be considered places of public accommodation,
but rather that courts have placed so much focus on the “place” aspect of the publicaccommodation provision and not enough on the “affects commerce” aspect. See 42
U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006).
179
This Comment’s proposed “integration” standard is equally applicable to both
a separately owned website and a unitarily owned website. See, e.g., Young, 790 F.
Supp. 2d 1110; Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946.
180
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949. A totality of circumstances
approach may, like Target’s current state, lead to a continuum in which circuit courts
must ultimately define different points; however, adding specific factors to such an
analysis will provide a more concrete standard than the unformulated one that Target

KEDDIS (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

3/28/2013 4:14 PM

COMMENT

879

“duality,” meaning that the website allows consumers to engage in
specific actions that they can also perform in the store, or that the site
181
affects the enjoyment of other goods and services of the store. The
following website functions are examples of the types of dual-use
functions that courts should consider: (1) accessing store
information; (2) refilling a prescription or ordering photographs for
in-store pick-up; (3) printing online coupons redeemable in the
store; and (4) obtaining products offered both online and in the
182
store. The Target court’s enumeration of such functions is the only
indicator it gave of what may constitute a heavily integrated website;
however, the court did not indicate whether any single factor is
183
dispositive.
Therefore, the more of these or other dual-natured
functions that a website possesses, the more likely courts will view it as
184
a doorway to a public accommodation.
ii. Additional “Backdoor” Factors from Young
The inquiry, however, would not end with the Target factors
because incorporating additional factors from Young will create a
185
spectrum that parallels the structure of the implicated business. A
plaintiff would need to demonstrate more to establish a “nexus” when
the litigation implicates a website of a completely virtual company
186
and less when it involves a retailer-companion website—as in Target.
When the defendant is a web-based company with some type of
physical presence in a place of public accommodation, courts must
also consider the degree to which the inaccessible website affects
enjoyment of the goods and services provided by the separately
creates. See DuPree, supra note 17, at 291.
181
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949.
182
Id. The court found that online-only deals or products would not affect
enjoyment of goods and services in the brick-and-mortar stores because they lack
duality. Id. at 956.
183
Id. at 949, 956.
184
See discussion infra Part IV.
185
Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see also supra
Part II.D. Consideration of the Target factors should be obligatory, but such factors
have more of a preliminary value. There are several types of business structures that
can exist, ranging from a completely virtual—or web-based—company to a brick-andmortar retail outlet with a companion website. Amazon.com is an example of a
completely virtual company because it does not have an apparent physical presence
in any place of public accommodation. See AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com
(last visited Mar. 17, 2012). Target Corp. is an example of a retail outlet with a
companion website. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946. Facebook, Inc.
could be an example of a structure in between these set-ups because it is a web-based
company with a presence in various retail stores.
186
See discussion infra Part IV.
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owned place. For instance, in Young, facebook.com’s inaccessibility
completely prevented the plaintiff from using—although not from
187
purchasing—the Facebook gift cards that retail stores sold.
Moreover, courts must consider whether purchasing the web-based
entity’s products in a store gives a customer any type of reward points
or store credit redeemable for the purchase of any store
188
merchandise.
iii. Recap of First Prong
A court’s consideration of these factors will account for both
companion websites—virtual front doors—and websites that create a
189
virtual backdoor to a place of public accommodation.
For the
companion websites like target.com, a plaintiff can satisfy
“integration” when customers can at least engage in “dual” functions
such as: (1) accessing store information; (2) refilling a prescription
or ordering photographs for store pick-up; (3) printing online
coupons redeemable in the store; and (4) obtaining products offered
190
both online and in the store. For all other websites, a plaintiff must
establish all of these types of functions plus the Young factors, such as
the existence of a mutually beneficial rewards program or that a
website’s inaccessibility actually deprives a plaintiff of the ability to
use a product or service that the company offers both on its website
191
and in the store.
2. Second Prong: “Operation”
i. Step One: Control of Heavily Integrated Inaccessible
Websites
Once a plaintiff establishes “integration” between a website and
187

Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115; Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 5; see
supra Part II.D.
188
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
189
Target.com is an example of a virtual front door because Target owns and
operates it, and it has dual-natured functions. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d
at 948–49. Young presents a potential example of a virtual back door because
Facebook, Inc. does not own a brick-and-mortar store but its website nonetheless
prevents full and equal enjoyment of the goods that it provides through various
stores. Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110. A business’s structure alone should not cause
courts to overlook the presence of the type of discrimination that Title III aims to
prevent. Moreover, a vital aspect of Target is the court’s explicit affirmation that Title
III is applicable to off-site discrimination and intangible barriers that create such
discrimination, such as a medium of communication. See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452
F. Supp. 2d at 953–55.
190
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949.
191
See Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 5.
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a place of public accommodation, the first step under the “Backdoor
Nexus” Approach’s second prong is that the web-based company
must itself be responsible for the wrongful conduct. To be liable as a
Title III operator, the company must first control (or own) an
inaccessible website—meaning that it is a noncompliant virtual
192
space. This step is important because the common thread in Title
III franchising cases is determining whether a non-owning entity has
193
control over the accessibility barriers to a place.
If the plaintiff
demonstrates that the defendant controls the website, then courts
can extend this control to some type of control over the place
provided that the plaintiff meets the remaining steps.
ii. Step Two: Commercial Presence in a Place of Public
Accommodation
The second and most important step is that a plaintiff must
establish the company’s commercial presence in a separately owned
place of public accommodation by showing that the entity is engaging
194
in commerce through some aspect of the place.
To “engage in
commerce,” the web-based entity must provide a trademarked good
or service in a place of public accommodation; however, the good or
195
service must actually occupy a portion of the place. The presence
factor will be stronger for companies like Redbox that control and
utilize some type of physical mechanism to provide such goods and
196
services in a place—like a kiosk.
iii. Step Three: Prevention of Usage of Product or Service

192

See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (involving a single entity
that owns and operates both a noncompliant virtual space and a compliant physical
space).
193
See supra Parts III.A.2.i–ii.
194
This would include a kiosk or perhaps the section where gift cards are sold.
See discussion infra Part IV.B–C.
195
Web-based companies identify themselves to the public through a
trademark—like Facebook does with its gift cards. See supra note 102. Moreover,
even though “customers contract for liability on the basis of trademark, [they]
receive liability (or fail to receive it) on the basis of entity structure.” Lynn M.
LoPucki, Toward a Trademark-Based Liability System, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1099, 1113
(2002) (alteration in original).
196
See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. Airline ticket counters are an example of a
concrete space within a place of public accommodation. See supra note 165.
Moreover, kiosks themselves have been the subject of disability discrimination suits
when they are inaccessible to blind individuals, with the argument that a kiosk is a
“service of” a place of public accommodation. See supra Part II.E. For disability
discrimination suits involving airline websites and kiosks, see, e.g., Foley v. JetBlue
Airways, Corp., No. C 10-3882, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85426 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011).
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Establishing Presence
The second prong’s final step is that the website’s inaccessibility
must either create a separate benefit for those able to use the site, or
hinder enjoyment and use of the trademarked good or service that
establishes the web-based entity’s commercial presence in the place
of public accommodation. The website’s noncompliance will be even
stronger if the discriminatory effect on the trademarked goods or
services reaches other services or store merchandise that other
197
companies provide.
This step is critical because the effect of the
noncompliance must reach beyond the borders of virtual space and
198
enter the physical space.
iv. Recap of Second Prong
After satisfying the “integration” prong, a plaintiff can establish a
web-based entity’s “operation” of a place of public accommodation by
meeting the following steps: (1) ownership or control of an
inaccessible website; (2) existence of the web-based entity’s
commercial presence by showing that the entity engages in
commerce through a limited space of a place of public
accommodation; and (3) creation of a separate benefit, for those able
to use it, or hindrance of use or enjoyment of the trademarked
product or service that establishes the commercial presence in a
public accommodation.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE “BACKDOOR NEXUS” APPROACH
In order to demonstrate how the “Backdoor Nexus” approach
accounts for the interaction between physical and virtual spaces, this
section will apply the proposed framework for “integration” and
“operation” to Target, Young, and Redbox—an entity that may
“bridge” the two. This approach’s application will demonstrate how a
plaintiff can establish “integration” for unitary ownership scenarios,
such as retailer-companion websites or “one-step-removed” websites

197

While this element is similar to one of the Young factors, namely the rewards
program example, it is also suitable for establishing a non-owning entity’s presence
because of its website’s effects on unconnected products that the same store sells.
198
See, e.g., Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011). If
facebook.com’s inaccessibility only hindered the ability to social network, then the
discrimination would not be effectuated through the public accommodation. But
since the inaccessibility actually prevented a customer from using a gift card
purchased at a retail store, the discrimination extends through the public
accommodation. The same can be said more strongly for Redbox. See infra Part
IV.B.2.
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with slightly different functions than their store counterparts.
It
will also show how websites like Redbox and Facebook can be
integrated with separately owned places of public accommodation.
More importantly, the application to web-based entities with a
commercial presence, ranging from a physical mechanism providing
services in a limited space to a completely virtual presence, will reveal
how courts can approach “operation.”
A. Target and Companion Website Scenarios
1. “Integration”
Since the proposed totality of the circumstances approach is
built around the usage of Target’s Title III-covered website functions,
a brick-and-mortar store with a companion website should easily meet
the proposed “integration” standards. Apple is an example because it
has both brick-and-mortar Apple Stores and the Apple Store
200
Online.
Apple’s website exhibits numerous “dual” functions
because it allows customers to do the following: (1) view and
201
purchase the same products in stores; (2) use “personal pickup” to
202
order products for in-store retrieval; (3) access a store locator with
203
and (4) schedule in-store
hours of operation information;
204
appointments with members of the Genius Bar.
The more that a website’s functions deviate from those of the
store, the more factors from Target—and possibly Young—a plaintiff
must demonstrate. For example, Blockbuster Video, which has long
provided its rental services through brick-and-mortar stores, has

199

See supra notes 89, 132, 137. The Internet is dynamic and not every retailer
website will function the same way despite a clear common ownership. Therefore, a
totality of circumstances approach would account for the variability in websites’
designs and functions.
200
Apple Store Online, APPLE STORE, http://store.apple.com/us (last visited Jan. 27,
2012). Between the online store and the countless brick-and-mortar shops around
the world, Apple has a very pervasive presence, having even opened an elegantly
designed Apple Store in Grand Central Station in New York. Elizabeth Lazarowitz,
Apple Store Opens in Grand Central, NY DAILY NEWS (Dec. 8, 2011), available at
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-12-08/news/30492743_1_apple-store
-landmark-status-grand-central-terminal.
201
Apple Store Online, supra note 200.
202
Personal Pickup, APPLE STORE, http://www.store.apple.com/us/browse/home
/personal_pickup (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
203
Store Locator, APPLE STORE, http://www.apple.com/retail/ (last visited Jan. 6,
2013).
204
Genius Bar, APPLE STORE, http:// www.apple.com/retail/geniusbar/ (last
visited Feb. 8, 2012).
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205

added a companion website in recent years.
But blockbuster.com
has some functions more akin to Netflix’s DVD-by-mail service than
206
Even though patrons can use blockbuster.com to
to target.com.
207
locate specific brick-and-mortar stores
and review their video
208
inventories, one of the website’s main purposes is to enable
customers who subscribe to Blockbuster’s independent DVD-by-mail
209
service to manage their accounts.
The site does, however, allow
members of the DVD-by-mail service to return movies directly to the
210
brick-and-mortar store and exchange them for different ones.
Pursuant to Target, Title III will not cover blockbuster.com functions
that are geared toward the DVD-by-mail service because the statute
only applies to functions that have an effect on the enjoyment or
211
usage of goods and services that the retail stores offer. Therefore,
while blockbuster.com should also satisfy the “integration prong,” a
plaintiff may need to show some more factors on the sliding scale
because one of the website’s primary functions is to provide a DVDby-mail service, as opposed to acting as a door—at least a front
door—to the brick-and-mortar stores.
2. “Operation”
For companion website scenarios, the “operation” prong is not
an issue because the retailer indisputably owns and operates such
212
websites.
B. Redbox Scenario
1. “Integration”
Redbox, the long-time rival of rental company Netflix, is a more
difficult scenario than Target because it involves a company that
205

BLOCKBUSTER, www.blockbuster.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
See supra notes 89, 132. Blockbuster now also allows for online streaming like
Netflix. How On Demand Works, BLOCKBUSTER, http://www.blockbuster.com
/download/ondemand101 (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
207
Find a Blockbuster Store Near You, BLOCKBUSTER, http://www.blockbuster.com
/stores/storelocator (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
208
Check for In-Store Rental, BLOCKBUSTER, http://www.blockbuster.com/browse
/stores/storelocator/findStoresWithTitleAvailability (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
209
How Blockbuster Online Works, BLOCKBUSTER, http://www.blockbuster.com
/howitWorks (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
210
See id.
211
See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 956 (N.D.
Cal. 2006). But see supra text accompanying note 210.
212
E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949 (“Target.com is a website
owned and operated by Target.”); see also In-Store Coupons, supra note 90.
206
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functions by means of a website and in-store interactive kiosks across
the country, as opposed to a brick-and-mortar retailer with a
213
companion website. Redbox.com should still pass the “integration”
phase, however, because it allows customers to perform the following
dual-natured functions: (1) reserve movies online for in-store kiosk
214
215
pick-up; (2) find a Redbox location; (3) acquire promotional
216
codes to use at the kiosks for free or discounted rentals; and (4)
217
Therefore, the
conduct inventory searches of any kiosk location.
website is comparable to both target.com and blockbuster.com, and
meets all of the Target factors—and more—under the “Backdoor
218
Nexus” approach.
In addition to redbox.com’s dual-natured functions, the degree
to which the site’s inaccessibility can affect Redbox’s services presents
a strong case for “integration.”
Specifically, the website’s
inaccessibility to the disabled can create a separate or unequal benefit
219
in violation of Title III for those still able to access it. If a disabled
individual could not access redbox.com, then that individual would
be unable to locate the nearest kiosk or check a specific kiosk’s
inventory without physically entering the place of public
220
accommodation. More importantly, the disabled individual may be
unable to rent a specific movie because another person can instantly
reserve this movie online before the disabled individual sets foot in
213

Redbox allows consumers to select DVDs and Blu-Rays to rent both online via
its website and offline via its kiosks. Media Center Facts About Redbox, supra note 40.
The kiosks are always located either inside or directly outside of—and attached to—
various supermarkets and stores, such as Shop Rite and Walgreen’s.
214
REDBOX, www.redbox.com (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
215
Find a Redbox Location, REDBOX, http://www.redbox.com/locations (last visited
Feb. 8, 2012).
216
Help Center, REDBOX, https://redbox.custhelp.com/app/home (last visited
Feb. 8, 2012). Customers can also purchase “Redbox Gifts” redeemable for kiosk
promo codes. Redbox Makes Giving This Holiday Season Easy With New Redbox Gifts,
REDBOX (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.redbox.com/release_20111212.
217
All Movies, REDBOX, http://www.redbox.com/movies (last visited Feb. 8,
2012).
218
See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (N.D.
Cal. 2006) (“Through Target.com, a customer can access information on store
locations and hours, refill a prescription or order photo prints for pick-up at a store,
and print coupons to redeem at a store.”); supra Part IV.A.1.
219
The creation of a separate or unequal benefit is one type of disability
discrimination that Title III expressly prohibits. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii)
(2006). Young implicates a different type of prohibited discrimination because
facebook.com’s inaccessibility prevents any participation or enjoyment of a particular
good that is offered through a place of public accommodation. Young v. Facebook,
Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal 2011).
220
See supra notes 215, 217.
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221

the door and approaches the kiosk.
Therefore, although Redbox
does not own any place of public accommodation, it should meet the
“integration” prong because its customers can use its website to
perform functions akin to walking through the front door of a store
222
and selecting a movie directly from the kiosk.
Difficulty in applying “integration” may arise, however, from the
fact that the overall functionality of redbox.com is essentially limited
to streamlining the movie-selection process at kiosks—movies can
223
only be physically obtained from the kiosks themselves.
Even if
customers reserve movies online, they must still swipe a credit card in
224
the kiosk payment slot to commence the actual payment. Viewed in
a different way, however, this fact may keep Redbox closer to Target
because it ensures that the actual commercial transaction is occurring
within the place of public accommodation as opposed to solely in the
225
virtual space. Moreover, one blind advocacy group has gone a step
further in arguing that Redbox’s kiosks are places of public
accommodation because they are “rental establishments” under Title
226
III.
If courts accept this argument, then they could easily view
redbox.com as a companion website to Redbox kiosks based on its
227
Another argument is that Redbox kiosks are a
dual functions.
228
“service of” the sales establishments in which they reside. If courts
acknowledge this argument, they could consider redbox.com to be its
229
own service or a component of Redbox kiosks.

221

Cf. Redbox Complaint, supra note 126 (alleging inaccessibility to Redbox
kiosks themselves creates a separate benefit for those who are not blind or visually
impaired due to the touch screen rental process of the kiosks); see also Media Center
Facts About Redbox, supra note 40.
222
Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (N.D.
Cal. 2006).
223
How Redbox Works, REDBOX, http://www.redbox.com/howitworks (last visited
Feb. 8, 2012). One potential twist, however, is the announcement of a joint venture
between Redbox and Verizon to provide a future online streaming service akin to
Netflix. Ben Fritz, Redbox and Verizon to Create Streaming Movie Service, LOS ANGELES
TIMES (Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/07/business
/la-fi-ct-verizon-redbox-20120207. Even though Verizon would be this service’s
primary owner, this collaboration could potentially move Redbox a bit closer to
blockbuster.com or further toward Netflix. See id.
224
Media Center Facts About Redbox, supra note 40.
225
See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
226
Redbox Complaint, supra note 126, at 10; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(e)
(2006); supra Part II.E.
227
See supra notes 214–16 and accompanying text.
228
Redbox Complaint, supra note 126, at 10.
229
See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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2. “Operation”
An entity that is structured like Redbox may serve as the bridge
for “operation” between Title III franchising cases and Title III
Internet cases because its in-store interactive kiosks give it a true
commercial presence within a place of public accommodation.
Redbox easily meets the “operation” prong’s first step because it
would be responsible for any wrongful conduct since it owns and/or
controls a website that is heavily integrated with a place of public
230
accommodation.
While the second step is the most difficult,
Redbox has a strong presence in a place of public accommodation
because patrons access its rental services through physical
mechanisms—the kiosks—that are located within a particular part of
231
a retail store but remain under Redbox’s ownership or control.
Therefore, in addition to providing a trademarked service that
physically occupies and commercially transacts with customers in a
limited space of a retail store, Redbox also maintains control over
232
that space.
Moreover, Redbox’s kiosks have functions that
correspond with the surrounding retail stores because both utilize a
“self-service” model that allows customers to independently browse
233
items for purchase.
Redbox may indeed act as a bridge between
Title III franchising and Title III Internet cases because the former
cases characterize “operation” in the context of control over a
physical space, and Redbox exerts a similar control through its kiosks
234
that are attached to a portion of a physical space.
Redbox also meets the “operation” prong’s third step because
redbox.com’s inaccessibility to the disabled directly impacts the
trademarked service that establishes Redbox’s commercial presence
235
in a place of public accommodation—the kiosks. Specifically, such
inaccessibility would create an unequal or separate benefit for those
able to access the site. Since customers can use redbox.com to
instantly locate and reserve a specific movie, they can complete the
230

Terms and Conditions, REDBOX, http://www.redbox.com/terms (last updated
June 1, 2011) (alteration in original) (“These terms apply to Redbox.com . . . which
is owned or controlled by Redbox Automated Retail, LLC . . . .”).
231
Terms and Conditions, supra note 230.
232
Id.
233
See Lieber v. Macy’s West, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1081 (N.D. Cal.
1999)(discussing how most major retail stores generally operate via the “self-service”
model, meaning customers are expected to obtain merchandise by independently
browsing and/or searching through the display areas for an item that they wish to
purchase).
234
See supra notes 156, 159, 165 and accompanying text.
235
See How Redbox Works, supra note 223.
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rental process in just two steps: (1) touching the button “online
236
rental pickup” and (2) swiping the credit card used for reservation.
Those who are unable to access the site, however, are at a
disadvantage because they must use the less efficient seven-step kiosk
237
process. More importantly, before or during the movie selection at
a kiosk, a website user can instantly bypass the kiosk user by reserving
the same movie at the same location.
Redbox satisfies the
“operation” prong because it owns or controls a website that, when
inaccessible, creates a separate benefit for those who use its services,
which Redbox provides through a physical, commercial mechanism
that occupies part of a retail store.
C. Young Scenario and Other Completely Virtual Entities
1. “Integration”
Young is a much more difficult scenario than Target and Redbox
because Facebook is a completely virtual company like Amazon.
Facebook may, however, meet the “integration” standard because its
website possesses some of the Target factors and additional dualnatured functions. Facebook.com allows users to perform the
following functions: (1) locate a retail store that sells Facebook gift
cards; (2) redeem the value of Facebook gift cards purchased in
238
stores; and (3) purchase Facebook Credits online. The website only
possesses two of the Target factors, accessing store information and
239
offering the same product both online and in the store. Facebook
does not strongly meet these factors, however, because it only offers
one product, as opposed to offering multiple products online and in
240
stores.
236

Media Center Facts About Redbox, supra note 40 (alteration in original)
(“Consumers can pick up reserved movies or games in just seconds by following these
simple steps.”).
237
Customers first have to touch the button “rent a movie,” browse titles for
selection, “add to cart,” press “check out,” swipe a card, enter the card zip code, and
enter an e-mail address. Id.
238
Facebook Credits Page, supra note 102.
239
See id.
240
Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (N.D.
Cal. 2006). A company like Amazon may have a slightly stronger level of
“integration” because not only does its website sell a surplus of products, but Amazon
sells its Kindle e-readers and gift cards in various retail stores across the country.
Participating Retailers, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/feature.html?ie
=UTF8&docId=1000465651 (last visited Feb. 9, 2012). Like Facebook gift cards,
consumers can only use the Kindle and Amazon gift cards in conjunction with the
company website. Amazon.com Gift Cards, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com
/gp/gc (last visited Feb. 9, 2012). Moreover, Amazon has a mobile price-comparison
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Since Facebook is a virtual entity, it needs to meet more of the
Target factors and additional dual-natured functions to be on the
heavily integrated side of the sliding scale. The degree to which the
connections between facebook.com and a place of public
accommodation affect the enjoyment and usage of the Facebook gift
241
cards is substantial.
As alleged in Young, facebook.com’s
inaccessibility does not merely hinder enjoyment or usage of Facebook
242
gift cards—it completely prevents it. Those who purchase Facebook
gift cards can only redeem the cards’ values online and, thus, the
243
site’s inaccessibility results in the inability to use them.
Moreover,
the Best Buy rewards program creates a connection between
purchasing Facebook gift cards and purchasing other store
244
merchandise.
If facebook.com denies access to a disabled
individual, then that individual is much less likely to purchase
Facebook gift cards and, thus, does not acquire reward gift
245
certificates to purchase any other Best Buy products.
Therefore,
while facebook.com could potentially meet the “integration” prong,
the “integration” is not as strong as retailer-companion sites and
redbox.com, both of which meet most of the Target and additional
dual-natured functions.
2. “Operation”
Even if facebook.com meets the “integration” prong, it is
unlikely that Facebook will satisfy the “operation” prong because its
246
commercial presence is weak at best.
Facebook satisfies the
“operation” prong’s first step because it owns and controls a website
that, if inaccessible, is integrated with the retail stores that provide its
247
gift cards for purchase.
While Facebook provides a trademarked

application that, while meant to work in competition with retailers, is an extension of
its website that customers can use in physical stores. Shan Li, Furor Surrounds
Amazon’s Price-Comparison App, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 9, 2011), available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/09/business/la-fi-amazon-app-20111210.
If
retailers participated in Amazon’s price-comparison application, as opposed to
competing with Amazon, in order to offer customers the lowest prices, then perhaps
this could be indicative of both “integration” and presence.
241
See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see
also Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 7.
242
Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 5.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
See id.
246
Cf. discussion of Redbox “operation” supra Part IV.B.2; see also supra Part
III.B.2.ii.
247
Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113–15 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
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good through a place of public accommodation, the second step will
be very difficult because the company does not use any type of
248
Even if
physical mechanism, like a kiosk, to provide its goods.
courts are willing to view the aisles or shelves that contain Facebook’s
gift cards as physical mechanisms, Facebook does not control such
249
spaces like Redbox controls its kiosks.
Facebook does have some
presence in the retail stores that sell its gift cards, such as its
advertising and promotion and its participation in the Best Buy
250
rewards program. But this presence is much weaker, and therefore
insufficient under the second prong, than other web-based
companies like Redbox that have a physical commercial presence.
If Facebook had a strong enough presence to satisfy the second
step, it would meet the third step because facebook.com’s
inaccessibility would completely prevent use of the trademarked good
251
that established its commercial presence—Facebook gift cards.
Moreover, the discriminatory effect on the Facebook gift cards would
reach other store merchandise because of Facebook’s participation in
the Best Buy rewards program, even creating an unequal benefit for
252
those able to redeem the value of such cards.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent history of website litigation demonstrates the need
for a new theory to reconcile Title III, and in particular the “nexus”
approach, with the modern reality of places of public
accommodation. Even though Target was only a district court case, it
became a catalyst for a whole new class of Title III suits, especially in
253
the Northern District of California.
The year 2011 was the first
significant period for Title III website litigation since National
Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp. extended application of the
“nexus” approach to websites. It was a year ripe for revisiting the
issue of Title III’s applicability to the Internet and strengthening the
“nexus” approach because several major web-based companies like
248

See Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 5.
See Terms and Conditions, supra note 230.
250
See Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 6 (“Defendant advertises and
promotes Facebook, Inc. with InComm, Zynga and Facebook Applications at physical
brick and mortar stores.”).
251
See Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
252
The ability to redeem the value of Facebook gift cards may create a separate or
unequal benefit because website users are more likely to buy the gift cards and earn
reward points to purchase other merchandise. See Amended Complaint, supra note
31, at 5; Best Buy Reward Zone, supra note 105.
253
See BALLON, supra note 21.
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Facebook, Netflix, and Redbox were sued under Title III of the
254
But instead, the courts denied relief to another disabled
ADA.
individual despite the presence of a “nexus” argument reminiscent of
255
that in Target.
This Comment utilizes the 2011 Young v. Facebook, Inc. decision
and the 2012 suit against Redbox as examples of a potentially
recurring scenario that courts will face in future Title III litigation.
Courts will undoubtedly continue to face arguments from plaintiffs
who are seeking to establish a “nexus” between a noncompliant
virtual space that is heavily integrated with a separately owned
256
compliant physical space.
The “Backdoor Nexus” approach
demonstrates a potential solution that may move courts one step
closer to implementing their “judicial willingness” to bring websites
257
within Title III’s coverage.
This method calls for courts to implement a two prong
framework for assessing “integration” between websites and places of
public accommodation, and a web-based entity’s potential
“operation” of such places.
The first prong, focusing on
“integration,” is a totality of circumstances approach that consists of
Target’s Title III-covered website functions and additional dualnatured factors from Young. The more dual-natured functions that a
website possesses, the more likely courts will view it on the sliding
scale as a doorway to a place of public accommodation. The second
prong, “operation,” consists of three steps that assess whether a webbased entity: (1) has control or ownership of an inaccessible website;
(2) provides goods or services through a limited space of a place of
public accommodation; and (3) has an inaccessible website that
creates a separate benefit or hinders enjoyment of the good or service
that establishes its commercial presence in a place of public
accommodation.
Recent Title III suits against major web-based companies like
Netflix and Redbox suggest the types of Title III cases that are on the
258
horizon.
With a methodical approach like the one this Comment
proposes, courts can subject retailer-companion websites like that in
Target or Apple to Title III liability for ADA noncompliance.
254

See Baynes, supra note 95.
See Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110.
256
See, e.g., Redbox Complaint, supra note 126.
257
See DuPree, supra note 17, at 290–91.
258
The Title III litigation involving Netflix is still underway. See supra note 95.
Moreover, Redbox is the example of what is to come because it is a company with a
website and a physical kiosk that occupies a limited space within a statutorily
accepted place of public accommodation. See Redbox Complaint, supra note 126.
255
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Moreover, Title III will cover noncompliant web-based companies like
Redbox that do not own a place of public accommodation but have a
physical presence in such places. The liability of completely virtual
entities like Amazon is still difficult to assess, but the “Backdoor
Nexus” approach accounts for these entities while ensuring that the
“nexus” approach remains contoured to commerce that is engaged in
through a place of public accommodation. Although the “Backdoor
Nexus” approach ultimately does not remedy the injustice of Young,
this is not an indicator that Congress did not intend for Title III to
reach completely virtual entities.
This approach is aimed at
addressing the extent to which Target can accommodate situations
259
where the disabled cannot enter a physical space’s “doors.”
In
order to determine whether Title III can cover Facebook, courts will
need to reach even further into the virtual world and reinterpret the
public-accommodation provision by addressing the issue that this
Comment has excluded—the Internet itself as a place of public
260
accommodation.
The “Backdoor Nexus” approach will ultimately help courts
finally recognize the unique and evolving nature of the Internet and
the types of discrimination it may create in a place of public
accommodation. The word “place” is a “term of art” and warrants the
application of different theories that reflect the nature of its doors—
261
whether physical, virtual, front, or back. Until courts resume their
role as gatekeeper, plaintiffs will be at a disadvantage—not because of
their own disability but because of a disability in the current state of
the law.

259

This objective is in line with Title III’s purpose to ensure access to places of
public accommodation. Colker, supra note 5, at 402.
260
See supra notes 17, 18 and accompanying text. The United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts has taken one of the most recent steps toward
addressing this issue by finding that Netflix’s “Watch Instantly” video–streaming
website itself is a Title III place of public accommodation, applicable under the
statutory categories of either service establishments, places of entertainment, or
rental establishments. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., No. 11-CV-30168, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84518, at *9 (D. Mass. June 19, 2012).
261
See GLYNN, ANROW-RICHMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 39, at 509.

